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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a complete 
list of the parties named in the federal district court action is as follows: 
Plaintiffs 
Emily Egbert and Jerad Egbert, individually and as guardians for J.E., a minor. 
Defendant 
Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., a Japanese corporation. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented were certified by the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah. (AOB at Addendum A.) This court considers certified questions in 
light of the facts of the case in which the questions are certified. Richardson v. Navistar 
IntT Transp. Corp., 2000 UT 65 ffi[8-9, 8 P.3d 263 (noting question as phrased was rather 
ambiguous and therefore giving answer only with respect to specific facts of case at 
hand); see also Hirpa v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 948 P.2d 785, 787 n.l (Utah 1997) (selecting 
version of questions that better characterized legal issues to be resolved in case at hand). 
Therefore, Nissan describes the second question certified in the context of the facts of 
this case. 
Issue 1: Whether Utah Code section 78-15-6(3) is unconstitutional. 
Issue 2: Whether Utah recognizes Restatement (3d) of Torts: Products Liability 
§16(b)-(d) where one plaintiff is an active tortfeasor and the additional plaintiffs are part 
of the same economic unit, giving the active tortfeasor an incentive to claim that it is 
unclear which damages can be attributed to the alleged passive tortfeasor. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Certified questions of law are reviewed for correctness. Scott v. Hammock, 870 
P.2d 947, 949 (Utah 1994). 
PRESERVATION 
These issues were preserved in trial court motions and memoranda, pre-trial 
conferences, and the jury instruction conference. (R. 29, 57, 90, 93, 97-98, 306-07, 691-
95, 712, 731-36, 573-98, 658-66, 668-89.) 
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STATUTES AND RULES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
Products Liability Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(3). 
Liability Reform Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 to-43. 
Copies of these statutes are attached at Addenda A and B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Accident 
In March of 2002, plaintiffs Jerad and Emily Egbert (the "Egberts") were involved 
in an automobile accident on 1-15 between Cedar City and St. George, Utah. Egbert v. 
Nissan Motor Co, Ltd., 2007 UT 64, 1|2, 167 P.3d 1058 ("Egbert I"). While trying to 
avoid a slower-moving vehicle, Jerad Egbert lost control of his 1998 Nissan Altima 
causing it to leave the roadway and roll approximately three times. Id. The driver, Jerad 
Egbert, wore a seat belt, and the Egbert's two-year-old son, Cade, was properly restrained 
in a child seat. Neither received significant injuries. (R. 41,421.) Emily Egbert, Jerad's 
pregnant wife, was not using her seat belt and was ejected through the front passenger 
window as the car rolled. Egbert, 2007 UT 64 at f3; (R. 349.) Emily Egbert suffered a 
broken pelvis, injuries to her bladder, abrasions and contusions. Egbert, 2007 UT 64 at 
[^3. Her child, Janessa Egbert, was delivered by emergency C-section following the 
accident. IcL Janessa Egbert has a serious brain injury. Id. The parties dispute whether 
and to what extent the ejection proximately caused Janessa's brain injury. IdL 
B. The Parties' Claims and Defenses 
The Egberts brought products liability claims against Nissan North America, Inc., 
Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., and Central Glass Co., Ltd., ("Nissan") for strict liability and 
3 
negligence. LI at f4. The Egberts do not claim that any action or omission on the part 
of Nissan caused the accident. Instead, they assert that the 1998 Altima was defective in 
design and unreasonably dangerous because the Altima's -side window glass did not 
prevent Emily from being ejected during the rollover. Id The Egberts have described 
their products liability theory as one of "crashworthiness" or "enhanced injury." They 
assert that Emily would not have been ejected had the vehicle been designed with side 
windows made of framed laminated glass, rather than tempered safety glass. Id. The 
Egberts also contend that had Emily not been ejected, her injuries would have been less 
serious, and Janessa would not have suffered a brain injury. Id. Plaintiff Jerad Egbert 
has also made an affirmative claim for loss of consortium. 
Nissan denies it was responsible in any way for the accident or injuries. Id. at ^|5. 
Jerad Egbert wras inattentive and lost control of the car, causing the accident and the 
resulting injuries. Nissan argues that the car was not defective or unreasonably 
dangerous, that it was not negligent with respect to the design and manufacture of the car, 
including the choice of tempered safety glass, and that the tempered safety glass was not 
a proximate cause of any of the alleged injuries, [d. Moreover, Nissan asserts that Emily 
would not have been contained within the vehicle during this severe rollover accident 
even if the Altima's side windows had contained laminated glass, instead of tempered 
safety glass. Id. 
Notably, all passenger cars manufactured in the United States in 1997—when the 
Egbert's Altima was manufactured and sold—used tempered safety glass in front side 
1
 Nissan North America, Inc. and Central Glass Co., Ltd. were dismissed during pre-trial 
proceedings. 
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windows. (R. 42). The tempered safety glass installed in the moveable side windows of 
the 1998 Nissan Altima met the applicable federal glazing requirements set forth in 
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 205 ("FMVSS 205"), 
C. Prior Certification to this Court 
On May 6, 2006, Judge Cassell certified two questions to this court: (1) whether 
the jury is to be instructed on the presumption of non-defectiveness that arises in Nissan's 
favor under Utah Code section 78-15-6(3) and what evidentiary burden is required to 
overcome the presumption; and (2) whether Utah law recognizes a "crashworthiness" or 
"enhanced injury" theory of products liability, as outlined in section 16(a) of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts. On August 24, 2007, this court found that the jury should 
be instructed on section 78-15-6(3)'s rebuttable presumption of nondefectiveness and that 
section 16(a) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts Products Liability, the enhanced injury 
theory of products liability, applies in Utah. 
Judge Benson has now certified two additional issues to the court—whether Utah 
Code section 78-15-6(3) is constitutional, and who should bear the burden of proving that 
the Egberts' injuries were indeed enhanced by the alleged defect in the Altima's 
passenger side window glass.2 (AOB at Addendum A.) 
In Egbert I, this court declined to address the burden of proof required in an enhanced 
injury case as this issue was not specifically certified. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On the first issue—whether section 78-15-6(3) is constitutional—Nissan asserts 
that the particular subsection is constitutional, and Utah law supports that finding. On the 
second issue—who has the burden of proving what damages, if any, were caused by a 
defect in the Altima—Nissan contends that the Egberts should have the burden of 
proving all aspects of their case, including enhanced injuries. 
Utah Code section 78-15-6(3), part of the Utah Product Liability Act ("UPLA"), is 
not unconstitutional. In Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, this court held that a 
different section of the UPLA—Utah Code section 78-15-3—was an unconstitutional 
statute of repose. 717 P.2d 670, 681-85 (Utah 1985). This court then determined that the 
remainder of the statute was invalid, not because the other sections were themselves 
unconstitutional, but because they could not be severed from the offending provision. Id. 
at 686. Utah Code section 78-15-6(3) is no more unconstitutional now than it was at the 
time Berry was decided; and the Egberts do not seriously contend otherwise. 
Instead, the Egberts argue that section 78-15-6(3) is invalid because it was not 
properly reenacted. Assuming the court addresses this distinct question, the Egberts' 
argument fails. The legislature and this court have implicitly recognized for decades that 
under Utah law when a court declares a non-severable statutory scheme invalid because 
one section is unconstitutional, the legislature can make the entire statutory scheme valid 
by fixing the specific constitutional defect. This is precisely what happened when the 
legislature amended section 78-15-3 in 1989 by replacing the unconstitutional statute of 
repose with a statute of limitation to comply with Berry. The remaining sections of the 
6 
Act—including section 78-15-6(3)—were still not severable, and therefore, again became 
operative, which explains why section 78-15-6(3) has been in the Utah Code ever since. 
To conclude otherwise leads to absurd results. If the provisions surrounding the 
unconstitutional section 78-15-3 were not "reenacted" when section 78-15-3 was 
amended, then there would be no surrounding statutory provisions to which the amended 
section 78-15-3 statute of limitations would apply. It is difficult to imagine that the 
legislature would have enacted a statute of limitation to replace the unconstitutional 
statute of repose if the new provision applied to nothing. Moreover, the legislature, 
courts, and citizens have recognized the provisions in the UPLA at Utah law for twenty 
years. This court should not undermine the predictability and uniformity in the law by 
holding that the UPLA was not technically reenacted as the Egberts would have 
preferred. As a matter of public policy, the UPLA should remain operative. 
As to the second certified issue—who has the burden of proof on the question of 
whether the Egberts' injuries were enhanced by the alleged defect—the Egberts seek to 
shift their causation burden to Nissan and to avoid having any fault apportioned to Jerad 
Egbert for his (admittedly) having caused the accident. To accept this approach would 
mean that Nissan, whose product played no role in causing the initial accident, would be 
held jointly and severally liable for the entire extent of the Egberts' harm. The better and 
more straightforward approach follows traditional tort causation law well-established in 
Utah by requiring a plaintiff to prove the extent of the enhanced injuries attributable to 
the defective design. This is particularly true under the specific facts of this case where 
the active tortfeasor is a plaintiff, the additional plaintiffs are part of the same economic 
unit, and the active tortfeasor therefore has an incentive to claim that it is unclear which 
7 
damages are in fact "enhanced" by an alleged product defect. In addition, the approach 
comports with the abolition of joint and several liability by Utah's Liability Reform Act. 
Accordingly, the court should decline to adopt Restatement (Third) of Torts section 16 
(b)-(d). 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH CODE SECTION 78-15-6(3) IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
A. The Egberts Have Not Addressed the Question of Whether Section 78-
15-6(3) Is Unconstitutional 
The Egberts do not address the first question certified by the district court: 
whether section 78-15-6(3) is unconstitutional. Instead, the Egberts address the question 
of whether section 78-15-6(3) was properly re-enacted by the legislature after this court 
declared it was not severable from 78-15-3, an unconstitutional statute of repose. Berry 
v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, 717 P.2d 670, 681-85 (Utah 1985). Importantly, Berry 
did not hold that section 78-15-6(3) was unconstitutional. And this court should not hold 
that section 78-15-6(3) is unconstitutional now, as the Egberts provide no basis for this 
court to do so. Therefore, the straightforward answer to the question actually certified— 
whether section 78-15-6(3) is unconstitutional—is "no." 
Even if the court addresses the distinct question discussed by the Egberts— 
whether the legislature "re-enacted" section 78-15-6(3)—the answer does not change. 
When the court invalidates a non-severable statutory scheme on the ground that one 
section of the scheme is unconstitutional, the legislature can "re-enact" the entire 
statutory scheme merely by fixing the constitutional defect. If a statutory scheme is non-
severable for purposes of judicial review, then it should be non-severable for purposes of 
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re-enactment. This is especially true here, where there is no dispute that for nearly two 
decades the legislature has intended, courts have considered, and citizens have relied 
upon, the statutory scheme containing section 78-15-6(3) to have been "re-enacted." 
B. Section 78-15-6(3) Became Valid When the Legislature Fixed the 
Constitutional Defect in Section 78-15-3 
The Egberts argue that the legislature did not specifically re-enact section 78-15-
6(3) after Berry; and therefore, it remains invalid. The flaw in this argument is its 
exclusive focus on legislative power and whether after Berry the legislature followed the 
procedure for enacting entirely new statute. The issue, however, is not whether the 
legislature enacted section 78-15-6(3) after Berry, but whether the legislature fixed the 
problem identified in Berry such that the entire statutory scheme, including section 78-
15-6(3), again became valid. This issue involves the scope and exercise of both judicial 
and legislative power, i.e., the status of non-severable aspects of a statutory scheme in 
which one section is declared unconstitutional by the judiciary and how a legislature can 
fix the constitutional defect identified by the judiciary. 
To understand why both judicial and legislative powers are at issue, it is important 
to understand what is not in dispute. First, if section 78-15-6(3) had never been enacted 
by the legislature, then it would not be valid. The bulk of the Egberts' argument 
concerning legislative power supports this obvious point. (AOB at 10-11.) Second, 
when the legislature enacted section 78-15-6(3) in 1977, it became valid. Third, in 1985 
Berry declared section 78-15-3 unconstitutional and section 78-15-6(3) non-severable 
from 78-15-3, rendering both sections invalid. And, therefore, had the legislature done 
9 
nothing in response to Berry, both section 78-15-3 and section 78-15-6(3) would have 
remained invalid. 
While none of these points are in dispute, they also -have nothing to do with the 
issue before the court. The issue presented here is whether what the legislature, in fact, 
did in response to Berry was sufficient to make section 78-15-6(3) again valid. To 
determine whether the legislature's response was adequate, however, first requires this 
court to determine the status of those sections of a statutory scheme declared invalid, not 
because they are themselves unconstitutional, but because thev are not severable from a 
section that is unconstitutional. More specifically, this court must initially determine the 
effect of the court's holding in Berry—(i) whether Berry required the legislature to re-
enact the entire statutory scheme just as it had enacted the statutory scheme in the first 
instance, or (ii) whether Berry required the legislature only to fix the specific 
constitutional defect identified in Berry for the entire statutory scheme again to become 
valid. This threshold question involves the effect of the exercise of judicial authority, not 
merely the constitutional scope of legislative power. 
Nissan contends that this court should expressly declare what it has implied for 
nearly two decades: when Utah appellate courts declare invalid a non-severable statutory 
scheme, properly enacted in the first instance., because one section of the statutory 
scheme is unconstitutional, the legislature can make the entire statutory scheme again 
valid by amending and re-enacting the section that contained the constitutional defect. 
This approach not only affords appropriate deference to the legislature and the statutory 
scheme it originally enacted, but it also is the approach both the legislature and courts 
10 
have assumed reflects Utah law. This approach is sensible, and there is no reason to chart 
a new course now. 
1. For Two Decades, the Legislature Has Assumed That By Fixing the 
Constitutional Defect in a Statutory Scheme, the Entire Statutory 
Scheme Becomes Valid 
The Egberts argue the deference to the legislature requires this court to declare 
unconstitutional a statutory scheme the legislature has considered valid for 20 years. The 
Egberts' appeal to deference makes no sense. Deference suggests that when the 
legislature properly enacts a non-severable statutory scheme, and the courts declare the 
substance of one section unconstitutional, the legislature may, as it did here, merely fix 
the constitutional defect to make the properly enacted statutory scheme again valid. 
Deference also suggests that this court expressly declare that this is Utah law because the 
legislature has assumed that this approach reflects Utah law for two decades. Deference, 
therefore, suggests exactly the opposite of what the Egberts ask this court to do. 
The best indication that the legislature believes that Utah law required them only 
to fix the specific constitutional defect identified in Berry is that the legislature has 
assumed that the UPLA, including section 78-15-6(3), has been part of the Utah Code for 
the last 20 years. Most recently, in February of 2008, when section 78 of the Utah Code 
was recodified, and revised, the UPLA was renumbered, along with the other provisions 
in section 78, and approved and codified by the legislature. 
And the fact that the UPLA has remained in the Code for two decades is not an 
oversight. In 1989, after the legislature amended the UPLA by replacing the statute of 
3
 The 2008 amendment, effective February 7, 2008, renumbered section 78-15-1 to -6 to 
section 78B-6-701 to -707 and made some stylistic changes to the Act. 
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repose declared unconstitutional with a statute of limitation consistent with the court's 
concern in Berry, the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel4 determined 
that the UPLA should appear in the Code because the legislature had fixed the problem 
identified in Berry.5 (Senate Bill 25, attached at Addendum C.)6 This position is 
consistent with the fact that section 78-15-3 was not severable from section 78-15-6(3). 
"Severability, where part of an act is unconstitutional, is primarily a matter of legislative 
intent." Id. (quoting Salt Lake City v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Utah, 563 P.2d 
There is an established legislative process by which laws that are enacted become part 
of the Utah Code. Utah Code section 36-12-12 provides that the Office of Legislative 
Research and General Counsel, an arm of the legislature, is responsible for seeing that 
enacted laws are incorporated into the Utah Code. Under section 36-12-(2)(g), the Office 
of Legislative Research and General Counsel is tasked with reviewing, examining, 
correcting, and approving the legislation and preparing the laws for publication. Section 
36-12-(2)(i) provides that the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel "is to 
formulate recommendations for clarification, classification, arrangement, codification, 
annotation and indexing of Utah statutes . . . ." Section 36-12-(3)(g) makes clear that the 
Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel is responsible for "merging any 
amendments, enactments or repealers to the same code provisions that are passed by the 
legislature." 
5
 Rules of statutory construction also underscore the frailty of the Egberts' "resurrection 
theory." Utah Code section 68-3-6 provides: "The provisions of any statute, so far as 
they are the same as those of any prior statute, shall be construed as a continuation of 
such provisions, and not as a new enactment." This section is based on section 14 of the 
Uniform Statute and Rule Construction Act, which provides that a statute which is 
revised, whether by amendment or by repeal and reenactment, is a continuation of the 
previous statute and not a new enactment to the extent that it contains substantially the 
same language as the previous statute. U.S.R.C.A. § 14. Only the new provisions are to 
be considered as having been enacted at the time of the amendment. The provisions 
introduced by an amendatory act should be read together with the provisions of the 
original section that are reenacted or left unchanged, as if they had been originally 
enacted as one section. Accordingly, the prior sections of the UPLA that were not 
amended are deemed to be a continuation of the statute. These provisions remain in the 
Code, not by re-enactment or implication, but by continuation. Attorney General v. 
Pomeroy, 73 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1937) (reenactment of statute of limitations by 1933 
revision amounted not to a repeal of the antecedent sections, but to a reaffirmation 
thereof). 
6
 Notably, Senate Bill 25 as introduced or enacted did not alter section 6. 
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786, 791 (Utah 1977)). If the legislature intended the entire statute to operate together at 
the time of Berry, then it makes sense that the legislature considered the entire statute 
again valid once the specific constitutional defect in section 78-15-3 was fixed. 
Moreover, as this court has recognized many times, "the best evidence of 
legislative intent is the plain language of the statute." Davis v. Provo City Corp., 2008 
UT 59, f l3 , 193 P.3d 86, 89 (Utah 2008); Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler 
Mfg. Co., 1999 UT 18, TJ30, 974 P.3d 1194, 1203 (Utah 1999). Tellingly, the reenacted 
version of section 78-15-3 references the rest of the Act: "A civil action under this 
chapter shall be brought within two years from the time the individual who would be the 
claimant in such action discovered, or in the exercise of due diligence should have 
discovered, both the harm and its cause." Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3 (emphasis added). 
It is apparent from the emphasized language that the Utah legislature intended that the 
remaining portions of the Act would become operative with section 78-15-3's elimination 
of the constitutional problem identified in Berry. 
The Egberts therefore cannot seriously dispute that the legislature believes Utah 
law is that once a court declares invalid a non-severable statutory scheme on the ground 
that one provision of that statutory scheme is unconstitutional, the legislature need only 
fix the constitutional defect to make the entire statutory scheme operative. Deference to 
the legislature suggests that this court declare expressly that this is, in fact, Utah law. 
2. For Two Decades, Courts Have Followed the Rule That By Fixing the 
Constitutional Defect in a Statutory Scheme, the Entire Statutory 
Scheme Becomes Valid 
The legislature's belief that it only had to fix the constitutional defect in section 
78-15-3 to make the entire UPLA, including section 78-15-6(3), valid is reasonable in 
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light of the fact that Utah courts have implicitly followed this rule in a number of cases. 
To date, nine Utah appellate decisions, including four decisions of this court, as well as 
two decisions of the Tenth Circuit, have applied the very statutory provisions that the 
Egberts contend has been invalid since 1985.7 In addition, the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah has routinely applied the statutory provisions as well,8 and 
has expressly held that section 78-15-6(3) is operative and constitutional.9 
As this court observed in Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., "[although section 78-1.5-
6(3) was neither repealed, amended, nor specifically reenacted, there is no indication that 
the legislature has changed its policy regarding deference to governmental standards." 
813 P.2d 89, 97 (Utah 1999). Grundberg held that a manufacturer of FDA-approved 
drugs is immune from strict liability claims based on design defect in light of the 
importance the legislature has placed on "governmental standards in Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78-15-6(3)." 813 P.2d at 97. As this court observed, "[i]n that section, the 
7
 Egbert v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2007 UT 64, 167 P.3d 1058 (Utah 2007); Slisze v. 
Stanley-Bostitch, 979 P.2d 317, 319-20 (Utah 1999); Nay v. Gen. Motors Corp., 850 P.2d 
1260, 1263 (Utah 1993); Grundberg v. Upjohn, 813 P.2d 89, 97-98 (Utah 1991); Dimick 
v. OHC Liquidation Trust, 157 P.3d 347, 349-51 (Utah Ct. App. 2007); House v. Armor 
of Am., 886 P.2d 542, 547 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., & 
The Bicycle Ctr., 876 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Maack v. Resource Design & 
Constr., 875 P.2d 570, 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 854 
P.2d 1025, 1027-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Taylor v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 130 F.3d 
1295 (10th Cir. 1997); Brown v. Sears & Roebuck Co., 328 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2003). 
8
 See, e.g., Ontiveors v. Danek Med., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18873 (D. Utah August 3, 
1999); Salt Lake City Corp., v. Kasler Corp., 855 F. Supp. 1560, 1571 (D. Utah 1994); 
Ghionis v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 839 F. Supp. 789, 794-95 (D. Utah 1993); Allen v. 
Minnstar, 1989 U.S. Lexis 18395, *5-8 (D. Utah December 20, 1989). 
9
 Henrie Northrup Grumman Corp., 2006 WL 1129399, *4 (D. Utah April 4, 2006) 
(analyzing Utah law on the constitutionality of section 78-15-6(3) and holding that, 
although the Utah Supreme Court had not specifically rule on the issue, applicable case 
law from this court indicated that the statute was constitutional). 
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legislature declared that there is a rebuttable presumption that a product which fully 
complies with the applicable government standards at the time of marketing is not 
defective. Id. Grundberg, therefore, demonstrates that this sourt has already recognized 
the legislature's intent that section 78-15-6(3) became operative in 1989. 
Furthermore, Egbert I confirms that the legislature's reenactment of section 78-15-
3 "addressed our constitutional concerns with the original section," citing Grundberg and 
Slisze as instances in which the court has sua sponte addressed this provision. Egbert v. 
Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2007 UT 64, J^8 n.3, 167 P.3d 1058. The court also held that the 
jury in this case should be instructed on Utah Code section 78-15-6(3)'s rebuttable 
presumption: "[T]he jury should be informed of the presumption of nondefectiveness 
under Utah Code section 78-15-6(3)." Id. The court went on to explain its analysis: "It 
is common to instruct juries as to the law, and as to presumptions specifically. 
Presumptions generally must be incorporated into the fact finding process for juries to 
appropriately discharge their obligations as fact finders. The Egberts do not cite a good 
reason, and we cannot conceive of one, not to instruct the jury here that the rebuttable 
presumption of nondefectiveness applies to Nissan." Id. at 1061 (emphasis added). This 
analysis presupposes that section 78-15-6(3) is valid. 
For all of the reasons set forth above, the court should make express what has been 
implied in its rulings for decades: section 78-15-6(3) became valid when the legislature 
amended and re-enacted section 78-15-3 to remove the constitutional defect identified in 
Berry. 
15 
II. PLAINTIFFS SHOULD HAVE THE BURDEN OF PROVING ALL 
ELEMENTS OF THEIR CASE, INCLUDING ENHANCED INJURY, AND 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT APPLY RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS SECTION 16 (b)-(d) 
There is great debate across the country on the question of where the burden of 
proof should rest in enhanced injury cases. There are two distinct lines of authority, one 
known as "Huddell/Caiazzo" and the other, "Fox/Mitchell." The Fox/Mitchell approach 
follows Restatement (Third) Section 16(b)-(d) and places the burden of proof on the 
question of enhanced injury on the defendant. In contrast, the Huddell/Caiazzo approach 
places the burden of proof of enhanced injury on the plaintiff. Nissan contends that this 
court should follow Huddell/Caiazzo, which is consistent with Utah law and well-
established tort law principles. This is particularly true under the specific facts of this 
case where the active tortfeasor is a plaintiff and the additional plaintiffs are part of the 
same economic unit, giving the active tortfeasor an incentive to claim that it is unclear 
which damages are in fact "enhanced" by an alleged product defect. Adopting 
Fox/Mitchell would be inconsistent with Utah law and irreconcilable with the Utah 
Liability Reform Act. Accordingly, the court should apply Huddell/Caiazzo and require 
the Egberts to prove all aspects of their enhanced injury claim, including the extent to 
which the injuries were purportedly enhanced by the alleged defect. 
A. The "Enhanced Injury" or "Crashworthiness" Doctrine 
In a crashworthiness or enhanced injury case, the plaintiff does not claim that a 
defect in a vehicle caused a collision, but instead claims that a defect in the vehicle 
caused injuries over and above those which would have been expected in the collision 
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absent the defect. The claim, in essence, is that the design of the vehicle failed 
reasonably to protect the occupant in a collision caused by someone else. 
The seminal case recognizing the enhanced injury doctrine is Larsen v. General 
Motors Corporation, 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). In Larsen, the Eighth Circuit held that 
the manufacturer had a duty to design the vehicle to avoid subjecting its users to an 
unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision. Id. at 502. Larsen did not hold that 
manufacturers are under a duty to design "accident-proof or fool-proof vehicles, nor did 
it hold that manufacturers are "insurers" of their products. Id. at 502-03. The 
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions now follow Larsen's reasoning—that 
manufacturers must design cars so that they are reasonably crashworthy. Berry 
Levenstam & Daryl J. Lapp, Plaintiffs Burden of Proving Enhanced Injury in 
Crashworthiness Cases: A Clash Worthy of Analysis, 38 De Paul L. Rev. 55, 61 n.33 
(1989). In states that have adopted the crashworthiness doctrine, it is adopted as a subset 
of the strict liability doctrine of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402 A, which 
imposes on a plaintiff "more rigorous proof requirements than a typical section 402A 
action." Barris v. Bob's Drag Chutes & Equip., Inc., 685 F.2d 94, 99 (3d Cir. 1982). 
Here, the Egberts are claiming that, although a defect in the vehicle did not cause 
the crash, Emily Egbert's injuries, and therefore Janessa's as well, were enhanced when 
the subject Altima's allegedly defective side window glass broke out during the rollover, 
Enhanced injury claims are also referred to as "second collision" or "crashworthiness" 
claims. Jackson v. Warrum, 535 N.E.2d 1207, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). In the second 
collision context, the "first collision" is the vehicle's collision with another object, and 
the "second collision" is the occupant's contact with interior structures or components of 
the vehicle, or exterior elements in the event of an ejection. Wemyss v. Coleman, Ky , 
729 S.W.2d 174, 179 (Ky. 1987). 
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allowing Emily to be ejected and injured. They correspondingly claim that, had the 
window been equipped with laminated glass, she would not have been ejected and, even 
though unrestrained, would have received less severe injuries because she would have 
remained within the vehicle during the entire crash. 
The question raised here is the following: which party bears the burden of proving 
what would have happened had Emily Egbert remained in the vehicle and unbelted 
through the entire accident sequence? This is really the crux of the Egberts', and any 
other, enhanced injury case—the claim that there would have been little or no injury 
absent the defect in design, and therefore, the defect made the injuries worse than they 
would have been otherwise. Yet although the Egberts do not dispute that they have to 
prove that the side window glass was defective and that their laminated glass alternative 
design was feasible, they contend that Nissan should have the burden of proving the 
degree to which the Egberts' injuries were enhanced. In other words, the Egberts seek to 
shift the critical component of causation onto the defendant. 
B. The Two Approaches to Proving Enhanced Injury 
Although the enhanced injury liability theory is well-established, controversy has 
arisen over the way in which a plaintiffs burden of proof of causation can be met. One 
group of cases, known as the "Huddell/Caiazzo" approach, requires a plaintiff to prove 
not only the injuries attributable to the accident, but also those attributable to the design 
defect. This approach is based upon Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976) 
(applying New Jersey law) and Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 
1981) (applying New York law). 
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The Huddle/Caiazzo approach simply follows general tort principles by requiring 
a plaintiff to bear the burden of proving all aspects of an enhanced injury claim, including 
the injuries that were enhanced by the alleged defect, i.e., the injuries actually caused by 
the defendant. In Huddell, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to satisfy her 
burden of proving enhanced injury. In so doing, the Third Circuit formulated the 
following standard: "First, in establishing that the design in question was defective, the 
plaintiff must offer proof of an alternative, safer design, practicable under the 
circumstances. . . . Second, the plaintiff must offer proof of what injuries, if any, would 
have resulted had the alternative, safer design been used. . . . Third, . . . the plaintiff must 
offer some method of establishing the extent of enhanced injuries attributable to the 
defective design." Id. at 737-38 (emphasis added). The Second Circuit reached the same 
conclusion in Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., holding "the plaintiff should be required 
to prove the extent of the enhanced injuries attributable to the defective design", and that 
such proof requires a showing of the actual nature and the extent of the enhanced injury. 
647 F.2d 241, 250-51 (2d Cir. 1981). 
The Huddell/Caiazzo approach has been 'adopted in numerous jurisdictions,11 
including the United States District Court for the District of Utah. In Allen v. Minnstar, 
11
 Toyota Motor Corp. v. Gregory, 136 S.W.3d 35 (Ky. 2004); Sumner v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 538 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) rev'd on other grounds by Lopez v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 538 N.W.2d 861 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); Reed v. Chrysler Corp., 494 
N.W.2d 224 (Iowa 1992); Duran v. Gen. Motors. Corp., 688 P.2d 779 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1983) rev'd on other grounds by Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54 (N.M. 
1995); Garcia v. Rivera, 160 A.D.2d 274 (N.Y. App. Div. 199); Masterman v. Veldman's 
Equipment, Inc., 530 N.E.2d 312, 318 (Ind. App. Ct. 1988) (there is a split of opinion in 
Indiana appellate courts, see Jackson v. Warrum, 535 N.E.2d 1207, 1216 (Ind. App. Ct. 
1989) (adopting Fox/Mitchell)); Mazda Motor Corp. v. Lindahl, 706 A.2d 526, 532 (Del. 
Supr. Ct. 1998); Armstrong v. Lorino, 580 So.2d 528, 530 (La. App. Ct. 1991); D'Amario 
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the court cited Huddell and declared: "To make out a prima facie case for enhanced 
injury, a plaintiff must show the existence of an alternative, safer design, practicable 
under the circumstances, and what injuries would have resulted had the safer design been 
utilized." 1989 WL 434765, *1 (D. Utah Nov. 21, 1989) (emphasis added), attached as 
Addendum D. The Huddell/Caiazzo approach also has been widely praised by courts 
and commentators as consistent with both the theoretical underpinnings of Larsen and 
with broader themes of product liability law. In sum, the Huddell/Caiazzo approach 
properly recognizes that a plaintiff asserting an enhanced injury claim must prove all 
aspects of the claim, including causation, by proving the extent of the injuries enhanced 
by the alleged product defect. 
The alternative approach is known as cTox/Mitchell." This approach is based 
upon Fox v. Ford Motor Co.; 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978) (applying Wyoming law), 
and Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, AG, 669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying 
Minnesota law), and later espoused by the Restatement (Third) of Torts, section 16 (c). 
The Fox/Mitchell approach significantly relaxes the plaintiffs burden of proof of 
v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So.2d 424, 437 (Fla. 2001). See also Caiazzo v. Volswagenwerk 
A.G., 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981). 
Although the Court determined that Allen was not an enhanced injury case, it 
specifically indicated that the heightened burden provided by Huddell would apply to 
such a case. Allen, 1989 WL 434765 at *1 ("Apparently Allen resists this 
characterization because of the evidentiary showing necessary to allow his claim to 
proceed to trial."). 
3
 Heather Fox Vickies and Michael E. Oldham, Enhanced Injury Should Not Equal 
Enhanced Liability, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 417 (1995), attached as Addendum E; see also 
Louis R. Frumer & Melvin L. Friedman, Products Liability 21.04[1], at 21-26 (1991) 
(stating that the Huddell approach clearly represents "the current and better view" and is 
eminently fair to all litigants in that it places the burden of proof where it properly 
belongs, on the plaintiff, to prove with particularity the injuries that have been enhanced). 
20 
proximate cause, shifts the critical part of that burden to the defendant, and embraces 
joint and several liability. 
Under the Fox/Mitchell approach, a plaintiff must demonstrate only that the 
alleged defect was a substantial factor in causing some injuries to a plaintiff, at which 
point the causation burden shifts to the manufacturer to prove which injuries resulted 
from the initial accident and which injuries resulted from the vehicle's allegedly defective 
design. In Fox, the court saw no difference between an enhanced injury case and one in 
which a passive tortfeasor and an active tortfeasor "cooperate" to produce an injury. Fox, 
575 F.2d at 787. The court further reasoned that apportionment or segregation of injuries 
is neither appropriate nor possible where an injury is "indivisible," such as death or 
paralysis, and in that case, a defendant will be jointly and severally liable for all injuries. 
Id. Thus, if such injuries cannot be segregated, the manufacturer—whose product played 
no role in the initial accident—is held jointly and severally liable for the entire extent of 
the plaintiffs damages. 
Although some courts have adopted the Fox/Mitchell approach,14 critics assert, 
and Nissan agrees, that this approach erodes the principles upon which Larsen and the 
14
 Gen. Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So.2d 1176, 1189-90 (Ala. 1985) overruled on 
other grounds by Schwartz v. Volvo N. Am. Corp., 554 So.2d 927 (Ala. 1989); Oakes v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., 628 N.E.2d 341, 349 (111. App. Ct. 1993); Valk Mfg. Co. v. 
Rangaswamv, 537 A.2d 622, 633 (Md. Ct. Spec. App., 1988) rev'd on other grounds 
Montgomery County v. Valk. Mfg. Co., 562 A.2d 1246 (Md. 1989); Lally v. Volkswagen 
Aktiengesellschaft, 698 N.E.2d 28, 39 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998); McDowell v. Kawasaki 
Motors Corp. USA, 799 S.W.2d 854, 867 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Kudlacek v. Fiat S.pA, 
509 N.W.2d 603, 611-12 (Neb. 1994); Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 761 A.2d 477, 
482-83 (N.H. 2000); Harsh v. Petroll, 887 A.2d 209, 217-19 (Pa. 2005); Gen. Motors 
Corp. v. Castaneda, 980 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App. 1998); Blankenship v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781, 786 (W. Va. 1991); Maskrey v. Volkwagenwerk A.G., 370 
N.W.2d 815, 821 (Wise. Ct. App. 1985); Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123, 
1130(Wyo. 1978). 
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enhanced injury doctrine are grounded and unfairly extends manufacturers' potential 
liability far beyond the actual enhanced injuries to all injury sustained in an accident 
which the manufacturer played no part in causing.15 
C. The Huddell/Caiazzo Approach is Consistent with Utah Law and Should be 
Adopted. 
Federal courts analyzing the burden of proof in an enhanced injury case must look 
to the substantive law of the forum state. Wankier v. Crown Equip. Co., 353 F.3d 862, 
866 (10th Cir. 2003). Not surprisingly, the Tenth Circuit has reached different results as 
to what burden to apply in an enhanced injury case depending on the underlying state 
law. Compare Allen v. Minnstar, 1989 WL 434765 (D. Utah Nov. 21, 1989) (Utah), with 
Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 890 F.2d 1540 (10th Cir. 1990) (New Mexico) (both 
finding that a plaintiff bears the burden of proving enhanced injury) and Fox v. Ford 
Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978) (Wyoming) (shifting the causation burden to 
defendant); and! Harvey, 873 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1989) (also applying Wyoming law, 
but moving away from the Fox/Mitchell approach and toward Huddell/Caiazzo). Since 
this court has only just recognized the enhanced injury doctrine, this court necessarily 
must look not only to existing Utah law, but also to pertinent authority from other sources 
for guidance. The Fox/Mitchell approach is in tension with existing Utah tort law and 
directly conflicts with the Utah Liability Reform Act's prohibition on joint and several 
liability. In contrast, the Huddell/Caiazzo approach accurately reflects the jurisprudence 
15
 2A Louis R. Frumer & Melvin L. Friedman, Products Liability 21.04[4], at 21-35; 
Heather Fox Vickies and Michael E. Oldham, Enhanced Injury Should Not Equal 
Enhanced Liability, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 417 (1995). 
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in Utah with respect to causation. In addition, general tort law principles and the 
direction of the states in the Tenth Circuit favor applying the Huddle/Caiazzo approach. 
1. Relaxing the Standard of Proof for Proximate Cause is Contrary to 
Existing Utah Law 
Under Utah law, a plaintiff bears "the ultimate burden of proving all the elements 
of his cause of action," including causation. Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, 874 P.2d 120, 
124 (Utah 1994); Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). In order to prevail on a claim of product defect, plaintiffs must show that: (1) the 
product was defective at the time it was sold; (2) the product was unreasonably dangerous 
at the time it was sold; and (3) the unreasonably dangerous and defective condition 
caused the plaintiffs injuries. Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6 (2007).16 To meet their burden 
of proof on causation, the Utah Court of Appeals has said that plaintiffs must adduce 
sufficient evidence '"from which the fact finder may rationally conclude that plaintiffs'] 
injuries and damages proximately resulted from the product's failure of performance 
causally related to its defective condition.'" Burns, 876 P.2d at 418. In other words, in 
Utah a plaintiff asserting a defect in design must prove that the defect proximately caused 
her injuries, and that an alternative design would have prevented them. 
16
 Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp , 869 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah 1993); Ernest W. Hahn, 
Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 1979). In addition, in a design defect 
case, a plaintiff must prove that a feasible alternative design would have prevented the 
plaintiffs injuries. Allen v. Minnstar, 8 F.3d 1470, 1479 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Now, in 
making our best effort to ascertain and apply Utah law, we conclude that the district 
judge did not err in holding that the plaintiff did bear the burden of showing that an 
alternative, safer design, practicable under the circumstances, was available at the time 
the boat and engine were sold."); Wankier v. Crown Equip. Corp., 353 F.3d 862, 866 
(10th Cir. 2003) (stating that the plaintiff, in a design defect case, "bears the burden of 
showing that an alternative, safer design, practicable under the circumstances, was 
available at the time the [products] were sold"). 
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This causation standard should apply equally to an enhanced injury case based on 
an alleged design defect. Indeed, this conclusion is supported by the only opinion of a 
court in Utah 1o address the issue. As indicated above, in Allen v. Minnstar the Utah 
District Court cited Huddell and declared: "To make out a prima facie case for enhanced 
injury, a plaintiff must show the existence of an alternative, safer design, practicable 
under the circumstances, and what injuries would have resulted had the safer design been 
utilized. 1989 WL 434765, *1 (D. Utah Nov. 21, 1989) (emphasis added). 
The Huddell/Caiazzo approach is fully consistent with Utah product liability law 
as discussed above. Under Huddell/Caiazzo, plaintiffs must prove the causation element 
of their claim by demonstrating that there is a difference between the actual injury 
sustained and the injury that would have occurred under the same circumstances had the 
design been different. In contrast, applying the Fox/Mitchell approach would erode the 
causation standard otherwise applicable under Utah tort doctrine. Under traditional legal 
principles, because the parties initiating complaints—plaintiffs—stand to benefit from the 
proof, they have the burden to prove each element of their claims. W. Prosser, Law of 
Torts § 38 (4th ed. 1971) ("The burden of proof. . . is quite uniformly upon the plaintiff, 
since he is asking the court for relief, and must lose if his case does not outweigh that of 
his adversary); Prosser & Keaton on Torts, § 41, p. 269 (5th ed. 1984). 
The Fox/Mitchell approach, however, allows a plaintiff to prevail despite 
inadequate and speculative proof of proximate cause. This court has held that when 
proof is "so tenuous, vague, or insufficiently established that determining causation 
becomes 'completely speculative,5 the claim fails as a matter of law.'"' Harline v. Barker, 
912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). In practice, the Fox/Mitchell approach 
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does not meet this threshold because it permits speculative proof of causation. 
Specifically, the "substantial factor" approach adopted by the Fox/Mitchell approach 
does not require proof of what a plaintiffs injuries would have been absent the alleged 
defect. Without such proof, no basis exists for determining that there is, in fact, an 
enhanced injury. In effect, the substantial factor approach relieves the plaintiff of the 
burden of proving a causal relationship between the defect and the injury being claimed. 
The result is that under Fox/Mitchell, a plaintiff can hold the manufacturer liable—jointly 
and severally liable—despite the fact that she cannot demonstrate that her injuries were 
actually enhanced due to the alleged defect. This is "directly at odds with the 
fundamental doctrine of enhanced injury liability." Levenstam & Lapp, 38 De Paul L. 
Rev. 55, 76. 
Put another way, limited enhanced-injury liability should not be converted into 
"plenary liability for the entire consequence of an accident which the automobile 
manufacturer played no part in precipitating." Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 739 (3d 
Cir. 1976). By effectively removing the element of causation from a plaintiffs case, the 
"substantial factor" approach leads to the imposition of absolute, rather than strict, 
liability, contrary to both the established tenets of strict liability and Utah law. Indeed, 
"[fjrom its inception . . . strict liability has never been, and is not now, absolute liability. 
As has been repeatedly expressed, under strict liability, the manufacturer does not thereby 
become an insurer" of its product. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 
152, 157 (Utah 1979) (quoting Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1165-1166 
(Cal. 1978)). This principle unquestionably applies in an enhanced injury case. Larsen, 
391 F.2d at 502-03. Under Huddell/Caiazzo, this problem is avoided by requiring 
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plaintiffs to satisfy their ordinary burden on causation by providing specific proof of 
injury enhancement. 
Despite the Egberts' argument to the contrary, this court in Tingey v. Christensen, 
987 P.2d 588, 592 (Utah 1999), has not endorsed the Fox/Mitchell approach by adopting 
Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 433(a) and (b) in the pre-existing injury context. 
(AOB at 13-14.) In Tingey, the plaintiff suffered from a host of physical problems that 
were allegedly exacerbated by a car accident. IcL at 591. At trial, her witnesses claimed 
it was impossible to apportion her pain and suffering between her pre-existing conditions 
and the injuries suffered in the car accident. Id The court agreed that a jury instruction 
should have been given informing that jury that if it "can find a reasonable basis for 
apportioning damages between a pre-existing condition and a subsequent tort, it should 
do so; however if the jury finds it impossible to apportion damages, it should find that 
tortfeasor is liable for the entire amount of damages." Id. at 592. The Egberts argue that 
this holding is consistent with the adoption of Fox -Mitchell in an enhanced injury case. 
This argument fails for at least two reasons. First, Tingey involved a so-called 
"egg-shell plaintiff," and therefore implicates the unrelated policy that a defendant should 
not benefit by injuring a person with pre-existing medical conditions rather than a healthy 
person. Unlike an "egg-shell plaintiff," the Egberts are not entitled to all damages 
suffered from all causes. Instead, the entire basis of their claim is that Nissan is liable 
only for the "enhanced" injuries that occurred due to Nissan's alleged failure to 
manufacture a crashworthy car. (AOB at 14 (admitting that plaintiff "retains the burden 
of proving defect and increased harm").) Accordingly, the very nature of the Egberts' 
claim requires that they parse out the "enhanced" damages from the damages that 
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ordinarily would have flowed from the accident. While an "egg-shell plaintiff," like the 
plaintiff in Tingey, is entitled to all damages to the extent they cannot be apportioned, 
this is not the case here. 
Second, the Utah Liability Reform Act was not implicated in Tingey. Unlike 
Tingey, this case does not involve a situation where there is only one person allegedly at 
fault. Mr. Egbert admittedly caused the accident and bears fault for his negligent acts. 
When there are multiple tortfeasors, as in this instance, the Utah Liability Reform Act 
requires that the damages be apportioned among the multiple tortfeasors. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-27 ("No defendant is liable . . . for any amount in excess of the proportion 
of fault attributed to that defendant"). Analogizing the damage caused by Mr. Egbert's 
negligence to the "pre-existing condition" of an "egg-shell plaintiff in Tingey disregards 
this state's clear requirement of fault apportionment among multiple tortfeasors and puts 
Nissan on the hook for all damages regardless of who was responsible for them. 
Although the Egberts' assert that Fox/Mitchell has been adopted by a "strong 
majority of courts," this claim is disingenuous. Criticizing the Restatement Reporters, 
legal scholars have pointed out that "recent decisions on the burden of proof issue are 
almost evenly split." Vickies and Oldham, Enhanced Injury Should Not Equal Enhanced 
Liability, 36 S. Tex. L. Rev. 417, 447 (1995) [hereinafter Vickies, Enhanced Injury]. 
Indeed, these scholars insist that no "majority" position has yet emerged; and in fact, 
most states have not yet directly addressed this issue." Id. To date, only twenty states 
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have adopted Fox/Mitchell17 while the other 30 states have either adopted Huddell18 or 
have not yet decided which of the two approaches they will follow.19 The majority of 
states that have adopted the Fox/Mitchell approach retain some form of joint and several 
liability. Thus, contrary to the Egberts' assertions, courts are deeply split on the question 
of which party has the burden of proof in enhanced injury cases. 
As pointed out by Vickies and Oldham, the Restatement Reporters 
"mischaracterize many states as supportive of the Fox/Mitchell approach when their case 
law either clearly does not support that approach or has not yet addressed the issue." 
Vickies, Enhanced Injury at 447. For example, the Reporters include New Jersey and 
Indiana as states supporting Fox/Mitchell despite the fact that most courts in New Jersey 
17
 See supra, note 14. 
18
 D'Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So.2d 424, 437-439 (Fla. 2001); Reed v. Chrysler 
Corp., 494 N.W.2d 224 (Iowa 1992); Toyota Motor Corp. v. Gregory, 136 S.W.3d 35 
(Ky. 2004); Sumner v. Gen. Motors Corp., 538 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) rev'd 
on other grounds by Lopez v. Gen. Motors Corp., 569 N.W.2d 861 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1997); Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 591 A.2d 966 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1991); See also Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir.1976); See also Mclaughlin v. 
Nissan Motors Corp., 655 A.2d 107 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994) Thornton v. General 
Motors Corp., 655 A.2d 107 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994); Duran v. General Motors 
Corp., 688 P.2d 779 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) rev'd on other grounds by Brooks v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54 (N.M. 1995); Garcia v. Rivera, 160 A.D.2d 274, (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1990); Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981). 
19
 These states are Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and 
Washington. 
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that have considered the issue have adopted Huddell/Caiazzo, and a clear split of 
authority exists in Indiana. 
Furthermore, the Reporters include Florida as a state that has or will adopt 
Fox/Mitchell. However, this conclusion is contrary to recent case law and the 
conclusions of legal scholars and practitioners in Florida. See D'Amario v. Ford Motor 
Co, 806 So.2d 424, 437-39 (Fla. 2001) (placing the burden on the plaintiff to prove the 
defect, the defect's causal relationship to the injuries and the "existence of additional or 
enhanced injuries caused by the defect."); and Larry Roth, The Burden of Proof 
Conundrum in Motor Vehicle Crashworthiness Cases, 80 Fla. Bar J. 10, 16-18 (Feb. 
2006) (asserting the Florida Supreme Court must adopted the Huddell/Caiazzo approach 
following its decision in D'Amario). 
Colorado is also cited by the Reporters as a state that would adopt Fox/Mitchell 
based on case law from the 1980s. The Reporters do not mention, however, that 
Colorado has since statutorily abolished joint and several liability. See Colo. Rev. Stat. 
13-21-406, 13-21-111.5 (2006). The Reporters also fail to acknowledge federal appellate 
court precedent imposing the burden of proving the extent of enhancement upon plaintiff 
under Colorado law. Curtis v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 808, 813 (10th Cir. 1981). 
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 Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 591 A.2d 966 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); 
Mclaughlin v. Nissan Motors Corp., 655 A.2d 107 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994); but 
see Thornton v. General Motors Corp.. 655 A.2d 107 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994) 
(disagreeing with McLaughlin and applying Fox-Mitchell). 
21
 Jackson v. Warrum, 535 N.E.2d 1207 (Ind. Ct. App. 1st dist. 1989) (adopting Fox-
Mitchell); vs. Masterman v. Veldman's Equip., Inc., 530 N.E.2d 312 (Ind. Ct. App. 3rd 
Dist. 1988) (adopting HuddelD. 
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That the Reporters repeatedly cite questionable and irrelevant state precedent to 
predict that jurisdictions will adopt the Fox/Mitchell approach entirely undermines the 
Restatements adoption of the Fox/Mitchell approach. 
The Tenth Circuit's recent interpretation of the law of surrounding states also 
endorses the Huddell/Caiazzo approach. As explained more fully below, this is in 
keeping with the trend in the various states toward abolishing joint and several liability in 
favor of pure comparative fault. In interpreting New Mexico law, which like Utah has 
abolished joint and several liability, the Tenth Circuit cited Huddell and found that New 
Mexico law requires a plaintiff to "offer some method of establishing the extent of 
enhanced injuries attributable to the defective design." Cleveland, 890 F.2d at 1546 
(citing Duran v. Gen. Motors Corp., 688 P.2d 779, 787 (N.M. 1983) and Huddell 537 
F.2dat738.). 
Likewise, applying Wyoming law, the Tenth Circuit has now determined that 
Wyoming does not follow the Fox/Mitchell approach. In Harvey v. General Motors 
Corporation, seeking to clarify its previous holding under Wyoming law in Fox, the 
Tenth Circuit substantially modified its prior decision. 873 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1989) 
(applying Wyoming law). Responding to criticism of the Fox decision, the court held: 
"In our view, Fox does not tell us that a finding of causation necessitates an award of 
damages. Rather, Fox permits apportionment of damages if there are distinct harms or 
there is a reasonable basis for determining the causes of injury." Id. at 1349. 
Consequently, Harvey held it is not enough to prove that a defect was a substantial factor 
in producing an injury. A plaintiff must prove that a defect caused injury "over and 
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above" the injury that "probably would have occurred" absent the alleged defect. Id. at 
1348-49. In sum, Harvey requires the plaintiff to prove the injuries he would have 
suffered but for the injury enhancing defect, moving the Tenth Circuit states (particularly 
Wyoming) closer to Huddell than Fox. Id.; Louis R. Frumer & Melvin L. Friedman, 
Products Liability § 21,04[3], at 21-44 n. 66. 
This court should likewise follow well-established principles of Utah law on the 
proof of causation. The court should find that the Egberts must prove all aspects of their 
product defect claim, including causation of their enhanced injuries. 
2. Utah's Liability Reform Act Abolished Joint and Several Liability 
Despite the fact that Utah statutorily abolished joint and several liability thirty 
years ago, the Egberts ask the court to adopt an approach to the enhanced injury doctrine 
that is based on joint and several liability. 
Utah enacted the Utah Liability Reform Act ("ULRA") in 1986. It abolished joint 
and several liability and adopted a comparative fault scheme, requiring the fault of 
plaintiffs and defendants to be compared by the jury and apportioned accordingly. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-38(3) (2007). The ULRA provides that u[n]o defendant is liable to 
any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributed 
to that defendant under Section 78-27-39." IdL at § 78-27-38(3). The statutory abolition 
of joint and several liability applies to all actions based upon the broad definition of fault, 
whatever the theory of liability, including strict products liability and negligence. Id. § 
78-27-37(2). 
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The purpose of the Act was to ensure that no defendant pay any more than its "fair 
share" of damages. Minutes, Utah Senate, State and Local Standing Committee, 46th 
Leg., 1986 General Sess. (Jan. 27, 1986); Floor Debate, Utah House of Representatives, 
46th Leg., 1986 General Sees., Records 17 & 18 (Feb. 26, 1986). As one senator 
observed, "it is the basic fairness concept we're driving at. The defendant ought to be on 
the hook only for its own percentage of damages, but ought not be the guarantor for 
everyone else's damages." Floor Debate, Utah Senate, 46th Leg. 1986, General Sess., 
Records No. 63 (Feb. 12, 1986) (emphasis added). It is clear from the legislative history 
that the Act was aimed at, among other things, "abolishing joint and several liability." Id. 
Contrary to the ULRA, the Fox/Mitchell approach imposes upon manufacturers 
joint and several liability when a plaintiff cannot show what enhanced injuries were 
incurred as a result of the alleged defect. Restatement (Third) of Torts, § 16(b)-(d); cmt. 
e (stating if plaintiff meets the substantial factor requirement the defendant is held 
"jointly and severally liable only for the increased harm" under subsection (b), and jointly 
and severally liable for the entire harm under subsection (c)). Tellingly, unlike Utah, the 
majority of states that have adopted the Fox/Mitchell approach also retain joint and 
several liability. Yet the Egberts argue that this court should hold that if enhanced 
These states are Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Wisconsin, and West 
Virginia. General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176, 1195 (Ala. 1985) (holding 
that where two or more tortfeasors act to produce an indivisible injury, apportionment is 
not allowed and each tortfeasor is jointly and severally liable); Oakes v. General Motors 
Corp., 628 N.E.2d 341, 349 (111. App. Ct. 1993) (finding joint and several liability if 
injury is indivisible and the defendant's defective product was a substantial factor in 
causing the injuries); Consumer Protection Div. v. Morgan, 874 A.2d 919, 950 (Md. 
2005) (stating that a single injury incapable of apportionment triggers joint and several 
liability); Shantigar Found, v. Bear Mountain Builders, 804 N.E.2d 324, 332 (Mass. 
2004) (stating that under Massachusetts's system of joint and several liability, a plaintiff 
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injuries cannot be proved with exactness, Nissan is liable for all injuries. This position 
conflicts with the Utah statute. 
The cases cited by the Egberts do not address joint and several liability at all. 
(AOB at 13-14.) Tingey v. Christensen is a negligence case against a single tortfeasor 
stemming from a traffic accident and Renegade Oil v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. is an 
insurance bad faith case. Tingey involved one tortfeasor and addressed the proper jury 
instruction to be given when a plaintiffs preexisting injury is aggravated in an accident. 
Tingey v. Christensen, 987 P.2d 588 (Utah 1999). Renegade Oil is even further removed, 
addressing the degree to which damages must be proven in an insurance bad faith case. 
Renegade Oil Inc. v. Progressive Gas Ins. Co., 101 P.2d 383 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). 
Neither of these cases addresses the burden of causation applicable to a product liability 
injured by more than one tortfeasor may sue any or all of them for her full damages); 
McDowell v. Kawasaki Motors Corp. USA, 799 S.W.2d 854, 867 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) 
(stating that where concurrent or successive negligent acts are in combination the direct 
and proximate cause of a single injury and it is impossible to determine in what 
proportion each contributed to the injury, then either negligent actor is responsible for the 
whole injury); Lindgren v. City of Gering, 292 N.W.2d 921 (Neb. 1980) (holding that if 
two causes produce a single indivisible injury, joint and several liability attaches); N.H. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507:7-e (1986) (joint and several liability unless fault is less than 50% 
and then several liability); Am. Agency Sys., Inc. v. Marceleno, 53 P.3d 929 (Okla. Civ. 
App. 2002) (finding that joint and several liability is the rule if the injured party is not 
negligent, despite the existence of a contrary statutory scheme); Menarde v. Philadelphia 
Transp. Co., 103 A.2d 681, 685 (Pa. 1954) (finding that "if defendant's negligence was a 
substantial factor in producing the result, in contributing to the injury, defendant is liable 
for the full amount of damages sustained, without any apportionment or diminution for 
the other cause or causes"); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.012-013 (Vernon 
1985) (joint and several liability if defendant's fault is more than 50%); Wis. Stat. § 
895.045 (1995) (joint and several liability if defendant is more than 51% at fault); W. Va. 
Code § 55-7-13; Bd. of Educ. of McDowell County v. Zando, Martin & Milstead, Inc., 
390 S.E.2d 796 (W.Va. 1990) (stating that the plaintiff may elect to sue any or all of 
those responsible for his injuries and collect his damages from whoever is able to pay, 
whatever the percentage of fault. Furthermore, the statute's modified rule for 
contributory negligence did not remove joint and several liability). 
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case and neither supports the adoption of the Fox/Mitchell approach in an enhanced 
injury case. 
What the Egberts are asking is to shift what is properly their burden of proof on 
causation to Nissan, thus depriving the jury of the ability to apportion fault to another 
tortfeasor, Jerad Egbert. The result would be to make Nissan jointly and severally liable 
for ah the damages attributable to the accident. This is specifically prohibited under the 
ULRA. The more consistent approach is found in Cleveland, where the Tenth Circuit 
determined whether fault should be apportioned between alleged tortfeasors that caused 
the accident and those that were liable for crashworthiness under New Mexico's nearly 
identical comparative fault scheme: "We are satisfied that the New Mexico Supreme 
Court would hold that common sense in the fair application of its pure comparative 
negligence system mandates that the negligence of all parties, including original 
tortfeasors and crashworthiness tortfeasors, which proximately causes enhanced injuries 
in a crashworthiness or "second collision" case must be compared." 890 F.2d at 1546. 
In sum, under the ULRA, an enhanced injury defendant cannot be held liable, 
jointly and severally or otherwise, for any harm beyond that for which it is responsible. 
Because the Fox/Mitchell approach embraces joint and several liability, this approach to 
the enhanced injury doctrine should be rejected by the court. The court should hold that 
Plaintiffs continue to bear the burden of establishing enhanced injury and that, if that 
burden can be met, fault must be apportioned to both Jerad Egbert and Nissan. 
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D. Public Policy Considerations Support the Adoption of the Huddell/Caiazzo 
Approach. 
1. The Huddell/Caiazzo Approach is Consistent with the Underlying 
Doctrine of Enhanced Injury Liability 
Levanstam and Lapp, in their analysis of the "enhanced injury" doctrine, note that 
it has two fundamental logical corollaries. First, because the allegedly defective product 
did not play a role in causing the initial accident, the manufacturer should be held liable 
only for injuries over and above those that would have been sustained as a result of the 
initial collision. Second, the plaintiff should bear the burden of proving causation 
between the alleged defect and the enhanced injury. The Huddell/Caiazzo approach to 
the element of proximate causation is "the logical extension of these two corollaries." 
Levanstam and Lapp, supra at 75. 
The Huddell/Caiazzo approach requires that the plaintiff prove the alleged defect 
is the sole cause of the enhanced injury, and plaintiff must offer proof of what injuries 
would have occurred as a result of the initial accident in the absence of the alleged defect. 
The "substantial factor" approach adopted by Fox/Mitchell does not require proof of what 
a plaintiffs injuries would have been absent the alleged defect. Without such proof, 
however, no basis exists for determining that there is, in fact, an enhanced injury. As the 
court in Larsen stated: 
Any . . . defect not causing the accident would not subject the 
manufacturer to liability for the entire damage, but the manufacturer 
should be liable for that portion for the damage or injury caused by 
the defective design over and above the damage or injury that 
probably would have occurred as a result of the impact or collision 
absent the defective design. 
391F.2dat503. 
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Under Huddell/Caiazzo, this problem is remedied by requiring specific proof of 
enhancement. By definition, an enhanced injury defendant has played no part in causing 
the initial accident. Limited enhanced-injury liability should not be converted into 
"plenary liability for the entire consequence of an accident which the automobile 
manufacturer played no part in precipitating." Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 739 (3d 
Cir. 1976). 
2. Huddell/Caiazzo is a More Fair and Workable Approach to the 
Enhanced Injury Doctrine 
In enhanced injury cases, it is "simpler, fairer, and conceptually more sound" to 
require plaintiffs to prove the extent of the enhancement." Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, 
A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 1981). Fox/Mitchell presents numerous practical 
problems. 
The manufacturer, in order to defend itself, is compelled to bear the burden of 
proving a negative—that the allegedly defective product did not cause plaintiffs' 
enhanced injuries. Moreover, placing the burden of disproving enhancement on the 
manufacturer encourages litigation because nearly every auto accident injury could be 
categorized as a "second collision" injury. Edward T. O'Donnell, Public Policy and the 
Burden of Proof in Enhanced Injury Litigation: A Case Study in the Dangers of Trends 
and Easy Assumptions, 17 W. St. U. L. Rev. 325 (1990). A plaintiff could argue while 
the accident was the fault of the driver of their vehicle or another vehicle, their injuries 
were enhanced by a vehicle component (i.e. airbag) or by the failure of the vehicle to 
keep them inside. Plaintiffs would have nothing to lose in joining manufacturers as 
defendants in nearly every case. Id. 
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Furthermore, a straightforward application of the Fox/Mitchell approach would 
result in the likelihood that accident-causing drivers will regularly be compensated by 
manufacturers for harm some portion of which proximately flow from their own conduct. 
This will be especially true in single-vehicle accidents, such as this one, where the 
accident is admittedly the fault of Jerad Egbert. The facts of this case provide a glimpse 
of the potential inequity of this approach: had Emily Egbert been wearing her seat belt, 
most if not all of any "enhanced injuries" would have been eliminated. This is 
particularly true under the facts of this case where the Egberts, including tortfeasor Jerad 
Egbert, are a single economic unit. Adopting Fox/Mitchell would give Jerad Egbert and 
those similarly situated every incentive to avoid having to parcel out injuries, as failing to 
do so would result in a windfall to him. Jerad Egbert has every incentive to sit back and 
do nothing but rely on the jury feeling sympathetic to his wife and child under the 
Fox/Mitchell approach, as such an approach allows him to escape his own liability. This 
court should not adopt an approach that allows a plaintiff to avoid the consequences of 
his or her own conduct. Utah law and sound public policy both suggest that this court 
adopt the Huddell/Caiazzo approach. 
13
 The trial court has held that while Nissan may introduce evidence of seatbelt nonuse for 
purposes of showing overall safe design of the vehicle and the accident sequence, the 
Utah Seatbelt Nonuse statute prohibits Nissan from asserting Emily Egbert's seatbelt 
nonuse was negligent. As Nissan is precluded from arguing that Emily Egbert's seatbelt 
nonuse was the proximate cause of her ejection, it would be inherently unfair to allow 
The Egberts to argue that the tempered glass window was the proximate cause of the 
Egbert's enhanced injuries without having to show the enhanced injuries with 
particularity. 
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CONCLUSION 
The court should hold that the UPLA is constitutional. Following the 1989 
enactment of the statute of limitations in section 3, the remaining portions of the UPLA 
became operative again. This explains why section 78-15-6(3) has been listed in the 
Utah Code for twenty years. Even during the last legislative session, when the entire 
section of the code that contained the UPLA was renumbered, the UPLA remained 
approved and codified by the legislature. It is not by mistake or oversight that the UPLA 
has remained part of the laws of Utah for twenty years, it is because of defined legislative 
process and unambiguous statutory requirements. 
Predictability and uniformity of law are of param nportance. Because 
residents, corporate citizens, and Utah courts have relied on and applied the UPLA 
consistently throughout the past twenty years, rendering it unconstitutional now would be 
entirely inappropriate. The UPLA is firmly consistent with the legislature's views. Thus, 
as a matter of public policy, the court should find that the UPLA remains operative. 
Furthermore, the Court should also adopt the Huddell/Caiazzo approach for 
determining when a plaintiff can recover for "enhanced injuries." Under the alternative 
Fox/Mitchell approach, a plaintiff can shift the burden of proving which injuries resulted 
from the original cause of the accident and which "enhanced injuries" resulted from a 
design defect. The Fox-Mitchell approach permits a defendant manufacturer to be held 
jointly and severally liable for a--plaintiff s entire injury, even where no party has 
established a link between any injuries and the allegedly defective product by a 
preponderance of the evidence. This result is contrary to public policy and the legislative 
history of the ULRA. This approach is especially harsh under the specific facts of this 
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case where the plaintiff himself is the cause of the accident. Adopting Fox/Mitchell in 
this case, where the active tortfeasor and additional plaintiffs are part of the same 
economic unit, would incentivize plaintiffs to claim that it is" unclear which damages can 
be attributed to the passive tortfeasor. 
In contrast, the Huddell/Caiazzo is not only consistent with Utah law, it is the 
better-reasoned approach to enhanced injury cases, particularly under the facts of this 
case. Huddell/Caiazzo appropriately requires a plaintiff to bear the burden of 
establishing causation. Enhanced injury should not equal enhanced liability for 
manufacturers. Fox/Mitchell should be rejected, and the jury should be instructed that 
the Egberts must specifically prove which injuries the alleged design defect caused. 
DATED this 27th day of May, 2009. 
Snell & Wilmer LLP 
KarniFFTBrown 
Troy L. Booher 
Attorneys for Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. 
39 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that 2 copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, 
postage prepaid, this 27th day of May, 2009, to each of the following: 
Patrick Ardis 
WOLFF ARDIS, PC 
5810 Shelby Oaks Drive 
Memphis, TN 38134 
David C. Biggs 
Kenneth D. Lougee 
STEELE & BIGGS 
5664 South Green Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Preston L. Handy 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
5664 South Green Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
9880055 7 
ADDENDUM 
Tab A 
78-15-6 Defect or defective condition making product unreasonably dangerous - Rebuttable 
presumption. 
In any action for damages for personal injury, death, or property damage allegedly caused by a defect in 
a product: 
(1) No product shall be considered to have a defect or to be in a defective condition, unless at the time 
the product was sold by the manufacturer or other initial seller, there was a defect or defective condition 
in the product which made the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. 
(2) As used in this act, "unreasonably dangerous" means that the product was dangerous to an extent 
beyond which would be contemplated by the ordinary and prudent buyer, consumer or user of that 
product in that community considering the product's characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers and uses 
together with any actual knowledge, training, or experience possessed by that particular buyer, user or 
consumer. 
(3) There is a rebuttable presumption that a product is free from any defect or defective condition where 
the alleged defect in the plans or designs for the product or the methods and techniques of 
manufacturing, inspecting and testing the product were in conformity with government standards 
established for that industry which were in existence at the time the plans or designs for the product or 
the methods and techniques of manufacturing, inspecting and testing the product were adopted. 
1977 
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78-27-37 Definitions. 
As used in Section 78-27-37 through Section 78-27-43 : 
(1) "Defendant" means a person, other than a person immune from suit as defined in Subsection (3), 
who is claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery. 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission proximately causing or 
contributing to injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, including negligence in all its 
degrees, comparative negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of express or implied 
warranty of a product, products liability, and misuse, modification, or abuse of a product. 
(3) "Person immune from suit" means: 
(a) an employer immune from suit under Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers' Compensation Act, or Chapter 
3, Utah Occupational Disease Act; and 
(b) a governmental entity or governmental employee immune from suit pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 
30d, Governmental Immunity Act of Utah. 
(4) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or reimbursement on its own behalf, 
or on behalf of another for whom it is authorized to act as legal representative. 
2005 
78-27-38 Comparative negligence. 
(1) The fault of a person seeking recovery may not alone bar recovery by that person. 
(2) A person seeking recovery may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose fault, 
combined with the fault of persons immune from suit and nonparties to whom fault is allocated, exceeds 
the fault of the person seeking recovery prior to any reallocation of fault made under Subsection 78-27-
39 (2). 
(3) No defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of 
fault attributed to that defendant under Section 78-27-39 . 
(4) (a) The fact finder may, and when requested by a party shall, allocate the percentage or proportion of 
fault attributable to each person seeking recovery, to each defendant, to any person immune from suit, 
and to any other person identified under Subsection 78-27-41 (4) for whom there is a factual and legal 
basis to allocate fault. In the case of a motor vehicle accident involving an unidentified motor vehicle, 
the existence of the vehicle shall be proven by clear and convincing evidence which may consist solely 
of one person's testimony. 
(b) Any fault allocated to a person immune from suit is considered only to accurately determine the fault 
of the person seeking recovery and a defendant and may not subject the person immune from suit to any 
liability, based on the allocation of fault, in this or any other action. 
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78-27-39 Separate special verdicts on total damages and proportion of fault. 
(1) The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury, if any, to find separate 
special verdicts determining the total amount of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of 
fault attributable to each person seeking recovery, to each defendant, to any person immune from suit, 
and to any other person identified under Subsection 78-27-41 (4) for whom there is a factual and legal 
basis to allocate fault. 
(2) (a) If the combined percentage or proportion of fault attributed to all persons immune from suit is 
less than 40%, the trial court shall reduce that percentage or proportion of fault to zero and reallocate 
that percentage or proportion of fault to the other parties and those identified under Subsection 78-27-41 
(4) for whom there is a factual and legal basis to allocate fault in proportion to the percentage or 
proportion of fault initially attributed to each by the fact finder. After this reallocation, cumulative fault 
shall equal 100% with the persons immune from suit being allocated no fault. 
(b) If the combined percentage or proportion of fault attributed to all persons immune from suit is 40% 
or more, that percentage or proportion of fault attributed to persons immune from suit may not be 
reduced under Subsection (2)(a). 
(c) (i) The jury may not be advised of the effect of any reallocation under Subsection (2). 
(ii) The jury may be advised that fault attributed to persons immune from suit may reduce the award of 
the person seeking recovery. 
(3) A person immune from suit may not be held liable, based on the allocation of fault, in this or any 
other action. 
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78-27-40 Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault - No contribution. 
(1) Subject to Section 78-27-38 , the maximum amount for which a defendant may be liable to any 
person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of the damages equivalent to the percentage or 
proportion of fault attributed to that defendant. 
(2) A defendant is not entitled to contribution from any other person. 
(3) A defendant or person seeking recovery may not bring a civil action against any person immune 
from suit to recover damages resulting from the allocation of fault under Section 78-27-38 . 
1994 
78-27-41 Joinder of defendants. 
(1) A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to the litigation, may join as a defendant, 
in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, any person other than a person immune from suit 
alleged to have caused or contributed to the injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the 
purpose of having determined their respective proportions of fault. 
(2) A person immune from suit may not be named as a defendant, but fault may be allocated to a person 
immune from suit solely for the purpose of accurately determining the fault of the person seeking 
recovery and all defendants. A person immune from suit is not subject to any liability, based on the 
allocation of fault, in this or any other action. 
(3) (a) A person immune from suit may intervene as a party under Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, regardless of whether or not money damages are sought. 
(b) A person immune from suit who intervenes in an action may not be held liable for any fault allocated 
to that person under Section 78-27-38 . 
(4) Fault may not be allocated to a non-party unless a party timely files a description of the factual and 
legal basis on which fault can be allocated and information identifying the non-party, to the extent 
known or reasonably available to the party, including name, address, telephone number and employer. 
The party shall file the description and identifying information in accordance with Rule 9., Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure or as ordered by the court but in no event later than 90 days before trial as provided in 
Rule 9, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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78-27-42 Release to one defendant does not discharge other defendants. 
A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants does not discharge any other 
defendant unless the release so provides. 
1986 
78-27-43 Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indemnity, contribution. 
Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any common law or statutory 
immunity from liability, including, but not limited to, governmental immunity as provided in Title 63, 
Chapter 30d, and the exclusive remedy provisions of Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers' Compensation Act. 
Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any right to indemnity or contribution 
arising from statute, contract, or agreement. 
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S. B. No. 25 By K. S. Cornaby 
AN ACT RELATING TO THE JUDICIAL CODE; AMENDING THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
ACT; PROVIDING A STATUTE OF LIMITATION ON BRINGING CLAIMS; AND 
PROVIDING SEVERABILITY. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
AMENDS: 
78-15-5, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 149, LAWS OF UTAH 1977 
REPEALS AND REENACTS: 
78-15-3, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 149, LAWS OF UTAH 1977 
REPEALS: 
78-15-2, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 149, LAWS OF UTAH 1977 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section 78-15-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
Chapter 149, Laws of Utah 1977, is repealed and reenacted to read: 
78-15-3. A civil action under this chapter shall be brought within 
two years from the time the individual who would be the claimant in such 
action discovered, or in the exercise of due diligence should have 
discovered, both the harm and its cause. 
Section 2. Section 78-15-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
Chapter 149, Laws of Utah 1977, is amended to read: 
78-15-5. [No—manufacturer—or—sefcier—of-a-product-shali-be-heid 
S. B. No. 25 
liabre-for-any-iniuryy-death-or-damage-to-property-sustained-as-a—result 
of an atxeged-defecty-failrure-to-warn-or-protect-or-faixttre-to-properiy 
instruct—in-the-use-or-misuse—of—that—producty—where—a—substantial 
contributing cause—of—the-injuryj-death-or-damage-to-property-was] For 
purposes of Section 78-27-38, fault shall include an alteration or 
modification of the product, which occurred subsequent to the sale by the 
manufacturer or seller to the initial user or consumer, and which changed 
the purpose, use, function, design^ or intended use or manner of use of 
the product from that for which the product was originally designed, 
tested^ or intended. 
Section 3. Section 78-15-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
Chapter 149, Laws of Utah 1977, is repealed. 
Section 4. If any provision »of this act, or the application of any 
provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder 
of this act is given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
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S T A T E OF" U T A H 
S A L T L A K E C I T Y 
March 1, 1989 
The Honorable Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor, State of Utah 
Dear Governor Bangerter: 
I have been directed to inform you that S. B. No. 25, 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY STATUTE OF LIMITATION, by Sen. K. S. Cornaby, 
has been signed by the President of the Senate and the Speaker 
of the House in open session and is being transmitted herewith 
for your action. 
Respectfully, 
j 2&y&s£<Z*/ 
Sophia C. Buckmiller 
Secretary of the Senate 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
STATE OF UTAH 
j 1 8 STATE CAPITOL • SALT LAKE CITY SA1 1 4 
February 20, 1989 
Mr. President: 
I am directed to inform the Senate that the House of Representatives 
has this day passed S. B. No. 25, PRODUCTS LIABILITY STATUTE OF 
LIMITATION, by Senator Cornaby, which has been signed by the Speaker in 
open session, and the same is transmitted herewith for the signature of 
the President. 
Respectfully, 
Carole E. Peterson 
Chief Clerk 
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S E N A T E C M A M B E I R 
S T A T E OF" U T A H 
S A L T L A K E C I T Y 
February 2, 1989 
Mr. President: 
The Senate Judiciary Standing Committee, to which was 
referred S.B. 25, PRODUCTS LIABILITY STATUTE OF LIMITATION, by 
Senator K. S. Cornaby, has carefully considered the bill and reports 
it out of committee with a favorable recommendation* 
Respectfj. 
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Not Reported in F.Supp. Page 1 
Not Reported in F.Supp., 1989 WL 434765 (D.Utah) 
(Cite as: 1989 WL 434765 (D.Utah)) 
HOnly the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, D. Utah, Central Divi-
sion. 
Scott ALLEN, Plaintiff, 
v. 
MINNSTAR, INC., dba Genmar Industries, Inc., dba 
Well-Craft Marine, and Outboard Marine Corpora-
tion, Defendant. 
GENMAR INDUSTRIES, INC., dba Wellcraft Ma-
rine, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, 
v. 
Mitchell HUFFMAN and Melvin Huffman, Third-
Party Defendants. 
No. 86-C-1074-S. 
Nov. 21, 1989. 
Jackson Howard, D. David Lambert, Leslie W. 
Slaugh, Howard, Lewis & Petersen, Provo, UT, for 
plaintiff. 
Todd S. Winegar, Karra J. Porter, Christensen, Jen-
sen & Powell, Salt Lake City, UT, Warren E. Piatt, 
Snell & Wilmer, Phoenix, AZ, Stephen B. Nebeker, 
Salt Lake City, UT, M. Dayle Jeffs, Jeffs & Jeffs, 
Provo, UT, for defendant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL RULING AND MEMORAN-
DUM DECISION 
SAM, District Judge. 
*1 Defendant Outboard Marine Corporation 
("OMC") moved this court for summary judgment on 
Plaintiff Scott Allen's ("Allen") strict products liabil-
ity claim on the basis that Allen failed to satisfy the 
elements of an enhanced injury claim. This court en-
tered a bench ruling in OMC's favor, but before a 
written opinion issued, Allen moved for relief from 
this court's ruling based on Fed.R.Civ.P. 54, 59 and 
60. This opinion supplements the court's bench ruling 
on OMC's motion for summary judgment and ad-
dresses Allen's later motion for relief from that deci-
sion. 
The facts on which this court bases its decision are 
not controverted: Mr. Allen was riding as a passenger 
in a boat on August 30, 1985 when the boat swerved 
causing him to be thrown from the boat into the wa-
ter. While Mr. Allen was in the water the propeller 
passed over him causing severe physical injury. One 
result of the accident was that Mr. Allen's left leg had 
to be amputated. He still carries significant scars on 
his right leg and buttocks area as a result of the pro-
peller cutting into his flesh. 
Mr. Allen has since sued OMC, the manufacturer of 
the engine, claiming that OMC is liable for his inju-
ries under a strict products liability theory. Mr. Allen 
couches this theory in terms of defective design-
alleging that the boat should have been equipped with 
a propeller guard which, according to Allen, would 
have prevented an accident of this kind. 
OMC moved for summary judgment on the basis that 
Allen was unable to present evidence on a safer alter-
native design which would have either prevented or 
lessened his injuries. OMC's arguments before this 
court focussed on the "enhanced injury theory" or 
"second collision" doctrine which is that, while the 
product defect did not cause the initial accident 
which gave rise to the injury, some defect in the 
product caused the injuries suffered by plaintiff to be 
more serious than they would have been absent such 
defect.— OMC points out that while the exposed 
propeller did not cause Allen to be thrown into the 
water (the "first" accident), it did inflict injuries after 
he was in the water. 
Allen, on the other hand, persists in his characteriza-
tion of this claim as a straightforward strict liability 
claim.— Under either theory, however, Allen's claim 
concerning the allegedly defective product must be 
dismissed as a matter of law.— Appeirently Allen 
resists this characterization because of the evidentiary 
showing necessary to allow his claim to proceed to 
trial. To make out a prima facie case for enhanced 
injury, a plaintiff must show the existence of an al-
ternative, safer design, practicable under the circum-
stances, and what injuries would have resulted had 
the safer design been utilized. Huddell v. Levin, 537 
F.2d 726 (3d Cir.1976). As OMC pointed out in its 
briefs, Allen has been unable to establish a prima 
facie case for enhanced injury. 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Not Reported in F.Supp. 
Not Reported in F.Supp., 1989 WL 434765 (D.Utah) 
(Cite as: 1989 WL 434765 (D.Utah)) 
Page 2 
According to Allen, such a flaw is not fatal because 
this is not an enhanced injury case. This court agrees 
that this is not an enhanced injury case, but a design 
defect case. However, OMC is still entitled to sum-
mary judgment due to Allen's inability to provide this 
court with evidence that the propeller was defectively 
designed-the same type of evidence necessary to 
make out a prima facie enhanced injury case. 
*2 The strict products liability theory is not designed 
to render a manufacturer an insurer of his product. 
Moreover, liability is not imposed automatically. 
Instead there must be a finding that the manufacturer 
somehow breached his duty to the injured party. 
In all products liability cases it is required that the 
plaintiff prove a causal connection between the al-
leged defect and the injury: 
While the language employed with each recovery 
theory varies, it is now clear that the tests in all 3 is 
the same: the plaintiff must show 1) the existence of 
a defect; 2) the attribution of the defect to the seller; 
and 3) a causal relation between the defect and the 
injury. 
Tauber v. Nissan Motor Corp., 671 F.Supp. 1070, 
1073 (D.Md.1987); see also. Olsen v. United States. 
521 F.Supp. 59. 63 (E.D.Penn.l981WyV/ 688 F.2d 
820 (3d Cir. 1982Vert, den. 459 U.S. 1107 0983); 
Jensen v. American Motors Corp.. 50 Md.App. 226, 
437 A.2d 242, 247 (1981). 
Utah law creates a rebuttable presumption of non-
defectiveness: 
There is a rebuttable presumption that a product is 
free from any defect or defective condition where the 
alleged defect in the plans or designs for the product 
or the methods and techniques of manufacturing, 
inspecting and testing the product were in conformity 
with government standards established for that indus-
try which were in existence at the time the plans or 
designs for the product or the methods and tech-
niques of manufacturing, inspecting and testing the 
product were adopted. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(3).— The evidence be-
fore this court as outlined in the parties' undisputed 
facts fails to overcome this presumption. 
Mr. Allen has pointed to evidence in depositions 
which, according to Allen, precludes summary judg-
ment on the issue of design defect. OMC, however, 
maintains that the information contained in those 
depositions not only fails to preclude summary judg-
ment, but militates in favor of summary judgment. 
Allen alleges essentially that OMC is liable for Al-
len's injuries due to the failure to design a boat with a 
prop guard which, according to Allen, would prevent 
objects (including persons) from coming into contact 
with the propeller. When a party alleges a design 
defect, the court must determine, not whether some 
other design would have been safer, but whether that 
particular design is defective and unreasonably dan-
gerous. Curtis v General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 
808, 811 (10th Cir.1981); McHargue v. Stokes Divi-
sion ofPennwalt, 686 F.Supp. 1428 (D.Colo. 1988). 
A factor central to the determination of whether there 
is a design defect is the availability of alternative 
designs. Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 
577 P.2d 1322, 1326(1978) (u[P]laintiff s burden in a 
design defect case includes a showing that there was 
an 'alternative, safer design, practicable under the 
circumstances/ or that 'in terms of cost, practicality 
and technical possibility, the alternative design was 
feasible' ") (citations omitted). If the plaintiff is un-
able to make such a showing, then it is not proper for 
the court to submit the question of design defect to 
the jury. McHargue, 686 F.Supp. at 1441; Wilson, 
577P.2dat 1327. 
*3 In Wilson the court held it improper to submit to 
the jury plaintiffs allegation that the defendant's use 
of a standard aircraft engine constituted a defect sim-
ply because "an engine of a different type, or with a 
different carburetor system, would be safer in one 
particular." Wilson, 577 P.2d at 1327. According to 
the court: 
It is not proper to submit such allegations to the jury 
unless the court is satisfied that there is evidence 
from which the jury could find the suggested alterna-
tives are not only technically feasible but also practi-
cable in terms of cost and the over-all design and 
operation of the product. It is part of the required 
proof that a design feature is a "defect" to present 
such evidence. 
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Id 
In resisting the motion for summary judgment, Allen 
has repeatedly referenced the depositions of its ex-
perts which, according to Allen, would testify as to 
the design and workability of a prop guard. However, 
Allen offers no evidence that such a design was 
commercially available at the time the stern drive left 
OMC's hands. The guard that Allen's expert (Chad-
well) testified should have been utilized did not even 
exist until 1989-more than ten years after OMC's 
involvement in the manufacturing process and four 
years after Allen was injured by the propeller. Allen's 
experts have also admitted that a propeller guard af-
fects boat performance, yet Allen has provided no 
evidence to this court that consumers would accept 
the diminished performance. Finally, plaintiffs ex-
perts have testified that prop guards are only theo-
retically possible. 
Without evidence of technically feasible alternative 
designs at the time the product was manufactured, a 
jury trial on the design defect issue is inappropriate. 
This court is unwilling to set a new precedent in 
products liability law by imposing liability on manu-
facturers whose products conform to the safety stan-
dards of the industry, but do not-incorporate every 
possible safety feature regardless of cost or effect on 
performance of the manufacturer's product. For those 
reasons this court granted summary judgment in fa-
vor of defendant OMC. 
Allen has moved for reconsideration of the court's 
decision based on Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), 59(a)(2) and 
60(b). Allen, however, fails to present this court with 
compelling reasons which support such a request. 
Rule 54(b) provides that any judgment on fewer than 
all of the claims "is subject to revision at any time 
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the 
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." 
That rule does not provide a basis which compels this 
court to reconsider its previous decision, especially 
when Allen has simply reiterated his previous argu-
ments. 
Rule 59(a)(2) applies specifically to motions for new 
trials. No trial has been had in this case, therefore 
Allen's reliance on Rule 59(a)(2) is misplaced. 
Finally, Allen suggests that Rule 60(b) entitles him to 
reconsideration of the court's decision. However, 
Allen relies on no new arguments in seeking the 
court's reconsideration of the summary judgment 
decision. He relies on the fact that the court intended 
to supplement the earlier ruling disregarding the fact 
that to supplement means to "explain" not to change. 
Allen also complains that he had insufficient time in 
which to respond to OMC's motion. However, the 
court allowed supplemental briefs after the hearing 
which, had there been any prejudice, would have 
effectively negated such prejudice. Furthermore, Al-
len has taken the opportunity to brief once more for 
this court the reasons he feels summary judgment 
should not have been granted. Still he has failed to 
make any new arguments which might persuade this 
court to reconsider its earlier decision. Accordingly, 
the court's decision stands. 
FN1. The "enhanced injury" theory is not 
limited in its application to instances 
wherein an automobile passenger has been 
injured, but has also been applied to boating 
accidents. See Rubin v. Brutus Corp., 487 
So.2d 360 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1986). 
FN2. Allen suggests that an enhanced injury 
claim can only be thus characterized if a 
plaintiff suffers an injury in addition to the 
one for which he sues. For example Allen 
states that if "the bone in plaintiffs leg had 
been shattered by a blunt impact with the 
outdrive system and that same leg was then 
injured by the propeller, this might be an 
enhanced injury case...." Plaintiffs Memo-
randum in Opposition to Defendant OMC's 
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of 
its Motion For Summary Judgment, p. 3. 
However, the enhanced injury' theory does 
not require that an injury precede the one for 
which a plaintiff sues. Huddell v. Levin, 537 
F.2d 726 (3rd Cir. 1976) (defective design of 
head restraint caused fatal head injury when 
decedent's non-moving car was rear-ended 
by car moving- 50 m.p.h.). The theory is 
rather that the injury that would have been 
suffered absent a defect is "enhanced" in 
terms of its severity due to the alleged defec-
tive design of a product. 
FN3. Summary judgment is appropriate 
when there are no issues of material fact 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Not Reported in F.Supp. Page 4 
Not Reported in F.Supp., 1989 WL 434765 (D.Utah) 
(Cite as: 1989 WL 434765 (D.Utah)) 
which preclude judgment on the pleadings. 
All of the evidence before the court, how-
ever, must be construed in favor of the non-
moving party. 
FN4. The same statute also provides that: 
(1) No product shall be considered to have 
a defect or to be in a defective condition, 
unless at the time the product was sold by 
the manufacturer or other initial seller, 
there was a defect or defective condition 
in the product which made the product un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or con-
sumer. 
(2) As used in this act, "unreasonably 
dangerous" means that the product was 
dangerous to an extent beyond which 
would be contemplated by the ordinary 
and prudent buyer, consumer or user of 
that product in that community consider-
ing the product's characteristics, propensi-
ties, risks, dangers and uses together with 
any actual knowledge, training, or experi-
ence possessed by that particular buyer, 
user or consumer. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(1 >(2V 
D.Utah, 1989. 
Allen v. Minnstar, Inc. 
Not Reported in F.Supp., 1989 WL 434765 (D.Utah) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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peals nearly thirty years ago,1 the doctrine variously known as "en-
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hanced injury,"2 "erashworthiness,"3 or "second collision"4 has 
become firmly entrenched in American product liability law. These 
three terms are most often used interchangeably to refer to the broad 
spectrum of cases based on claims that injuries sustained in an acci-
dent were aggravated or exacerbated due to a product defect, 
although the defect itself was not a cause of the original accident. 
Enhanced injury liability has grown into one of the most highly 
litigated and costly areas of tort law today. A successful claim often 
results in the imposition of multimillion dollar liability. These com-
plex cases, whether successful or not, result in substantial cost to the 
judicial system and to our society. The uncertainty which presently 
exists in enhanced injury theory inappropriately encourages litigation, 
resulting in even greater costs. Thus, unchecked, careless, or confus-
ing expansion of the doctrine poses a genuine threat to the ability of 
American manufacturers to compete in worldwide markets, as well as 
to the ability of average Americans to afford products and equipment 
as rising litigation and settlement costs continue to be passed on to 
consumers and businesses. 
As the American Law Institute prepares to adopt the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability (Restatement (Third)), containing 
a section entitled "Increased Harm Due to Product Defect," serious 
2. The term "enhanced injury" refers to the degree accident injuries are aggravated, 
due to an alleged defect, over and above that which would otherwise have been sustained 
absent the alleged defect. 2A Louis R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIA-
BILITY § 21.03, at 21-28 to 21-29 (1991) (revised by Cary S. Sklaren (1994)); Michael Hoe-
nig, Resolution of "Crashworthiness" Design Claims, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 633, 634 n3 
(1981). 
3. "Crashworthiness* is defined in the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings 
Act as "the protection that a passenger motor vehicle affords its passengers against per-
sonal injury or death as a result of a motor vehicle accident." 15 U.S.C. § 1901(14) (1976). 
For several judicial definitions of the term, see Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 
F2d 1066,1069 n3 (4th Cir. 1974)." 
4. "Second collision" usually refers to the actual physical impact between a passen-
ger and an interior part of the vehicle or something exterior to the vehicle following the 
primary impact Hoenig, supra note 2, at 634 n.2. 
Some commentators, have attempted to make distinctions between the enhanced in-
jury, erashworthiness, and second collision terms. See W. James Foiand, Enhanced Injury: 
Problems of Proof in "Second Collision" and "Crashworthy" Cases, 16 WASHBURN LJ. 
600,606-07 (1977). Mr. Foiand describes a "somewhat obtuse" distinction between second 
collision cases involving an actual secondary physical impact between the injured party and 
a specific part of the interior or exterior of the vehicle, and erashworthiness cases based 
upon an "'environmental* definition of intended use." Id However, because the doc-
trine's broad applicability can be masked by use of the "second collision" or "erashworthi-
ness" labels, "enhanced injury" is the more accurate term to describe such claims and will 
be utilized throughout this Article. See Thomas V. Harris, Enhanced Injury Theory: An 
Analytic Framework, 62 N.C L. REV. 643, 647-48 (1984); FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra 
note 2, § 21.03, at 21-27 to 21-28. 
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consideration must be given to underlying policy and the potential 
long-term effects of such a pronouncement on enhanced injury liabil-
ity.5 A major consideration must be the significant benefits which 
would inure from a uniform approach, adopted not only by the new 
Restatement (Third), but also by the courts and perhaps even by the 
United States Congress. 
This Article examines the historical development of the enhanced 
injury doctrine, discusses elements of the enhanced injury claim, in-
cluding areas of controversy such as the burden of proof of enhance-
ment, and presents a brief overview of recent case law and trends in 
the Nineties. Part II of this Article then analyzes the substance and 
practical effect of the proposed Restatement (Third) section on en-
hanced injury, concluding that it does not accurately reflect important 
underlying considerations of logic, policy, and theory, nor does it pro-
vide a uniform approach fairly balancing the interests of the consumer 
and industry. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENHANCED INJURY DOCTRINE 
A 1968: Larsen v. General Motors Corp. 
The enhanced injury theory was first adopted by the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in 1968 in Larsen v. General Motors Corp.6 At 
that time, "products liability" was a relatively young body of law ancf 
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was only three 
years old. The Larsen court was highly aware of the events going on 
around it and the changing attitudes of American society regarding 
safety, expressly noting National Safety Council statistics regarding 
automobile accident-related deaths and disabling injuries "since the 
advent of the horseless carriage."7 In addition, the court acknowl-
edged the recently enacted National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety 
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 11, at 253 (Council 
Draft No. 2.1994) [hereinafter Council Draft No. 2]. One need look no further than Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 402A to realize the potential influence of a novel Restatement 
section on enhanced injury. See Charles E. Cantu, Reflections on Section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts: A Mirror Crack W, 25 GONZ. L. REV. 205 (1989-90). Professor 
Cantu's article reveals that § 402A was not an accepted doctrine when it was adopted in 
1965 and has since been a "catalyst to a multitude of litigation** as interpretations of 
§ 402A stray farther and farther from its drafters' intentions. Id. at 206-07,211,236. The 
American Law Institute should take care to avoid similar results from the new Restatement 
(Third). 
6. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (applying Minnesota law). 
7. Id. at 502 n.4. 
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Act of 1966,B emphasizing that the court was merely complementing 
such legislative activity in the judicial sphere and reflecting the social, 
political and, economic climate surrounding it.9 
The Larsen case presents a classic example of a true "second col-
lision" injury. The plaintiff sustained severe head injuries in a head-on 
collision when the impact allegedly caused the steering mechanism of 
his 1963 Chevrolet Corvair to thrust rearward, striking him in the 
head.10 The plaintiff argued that the steering assembly was defectively 
designed, causing him to receive additional injuries or more severe 
injuries than he would have otherwise received in the collision absent 
the defect. The defendant contended that it had no duty to design and 
manufacture a vehicle that is safe to occupy during a collision.11 The 
trial court agreed with General Motors and granted summary judg-
ment in its favor. 
In the Larsen decision, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, re-
jected Evans v. General Motors Corp.,12 and reversed the trial court 
holding that manufacturers have a duty to use reasonable care in the 
design of vehicles to avoid subjecting users to unreasonable risks of 
injury in the event of a collision. Applying general negligence princi-
ples, the court emphasized that a manufacturer's duty extends to pro-
ducing a product that is reasonably fit for its intended use and free of 
hidden defects.13 Central to the court's holding was its recognition 
that collisions, with or without the fault of the driver, are a clearly 
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1966). The purpose of the Safety Act was "to reduce 
traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents" by 
establishing safety standards for vehicles and equipment, as well as by undertaking and 
supporting safety research and development Id § 1381 j . For legislative history of the Act, 
see H.R. REP. NO. 1776,89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); S. REP. NO. 1301,89th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2709, 2709; CONF. REP. NO. 1919, 89th C&ng., 2d 
Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.CCA.N. 2709, 2731. The National TVaffic Safety Bu-
reau (later the National Highway TVaffic Safety Administration, or "NHTSA") was created 
soon after to cany out the legislative mandate. See Exec. Order No. 11357, 32 Fed. Reg. 
8225 (1967). 
9. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 506; FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 21.01, at 21-2 to 
21-5. 
10. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 496-97. 
11. At at 497. 
12. 359 F.2d 822, 824 (7tb Cir.), cert denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966) (concluding in » 
divided decision applying Indiana law that manufacturers are under no duiy to make 
automobiles accident-proof nor to render vehicles safer when the danger to be avoided is 
obvious and collisions are not an intended use of automobiles; such claims are not actiona-
ble as a matter of law), overruled by Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104,110 (7th Cir. 
1977). 
13. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 501. 
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foreseeable and statistically inevitable result of the "intended use" of 
automobiles.14 
The Larsen court spoke only in terms of unreasonable risks of 
enhanced injury and disclaimed any duty to design accident-proof ve-
hicles or to insure their use.15 Further, the court pointedly empha-
sized that: 
Any design defect not causing the accident would not subject 
the manufacturer to liability for the entire damage, but the man-
ufacturer should be liable for that portion of the damage or in-
jury caused by the defective design over and above the damage 
or injury that probably would have occurred as a result of the 
impact or collision absent the defective design.16 
One commentator has described this as a "newly minted liability . . . 
limited to only those injuries which were actually enhanced by the [al-
leged] defect."17 
B. Post-1968: Acceptance and Expansion of Larsen 
After some early resistance,18 the enhanced injury doctrine origi-
nally adopted by the Larsen court appears to have been unanimously 
accepted by American jurisdictions.19 In Blankenship v. General Mo-
tors Corp.,20 the highest court of West Virginia recognized in 1991 that 
it had become the final state to accept the doctrine.21 Moreover, theo-
14. Id. at 501-02. The court cited authority stating that between one-fourth to two-
thirds of all automobiles are involved in an accident producing injury or death at some 
time during their useful life. Id. at 502. 
15. Id. at 503. 
16. Id. The concept of "enhanced injury" originates from this language in the Larsen 
decision. 
17. Hoenig, supra note 2, at 637; see also FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 21.02, 
at 21-18 (noting that the Larsen court was quite careful to limit the portion of liability 
which affixed to the enhanced injury defect). 
18. See FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 21.02, at 21-14 n.25 & 21-18 n.48. 
19. Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 11, Reporters* Note to cmt. a, at 265. For 
exhaustive listings of state and federal decisions following Larsen, see FRUMER & FRIED-
MAN, supra note 2, § 21.02, at 21-19 n.50; Barry Levenstam & Daryl J. Lapp, Plaintiffs 
Burden of Proving Enhanced Injury in Crashworthiness Cases: A Clash Worthy of Analy-
sis, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 55, 61 n33 (1988). 
20. 406 S.E.2d 781 (W. Va. 1991). 
21. The court, however, based its decision to adopt the enhanced injury doctrine prin-
cipally on the practical realization that, HWest Virginians . . . are already paying the prod-
uct liability insurance premium when they buy a . . . car, so this Court would be both 
foolish and irresponsible if we held that while West Virginians must pay the premiums, 
West Virginians can't collect the insurance after they're injured." Id. at 785. The court 
goes on to reject the burden of proof requirements of Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d 
Cir. 1976), for the same reasons, stating that although the Huddell standard makes a great 
deal of sense and perhaps should be the national standard in crashworthiness cases, "West 
Virginians are not going to pay product liability insurance premiums so that all the resi-
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ries of enhanced injury have been applied far beyond the realm of 
automobiles to products ranging from airplanes,22 to fabrics,23 to rid-
ing lawn mowers,24 to water ski bindings.25 This expansion is sup-
ported by the Larsen decision which made it clear that the duty 
recognized was one of general application to all products and was not 
limited to automobiles.26 Indeed, one commentator has stated that 
enhanced injury is "truly an area limited only by the imagination of 
counsel/'27 Unfortunately, this expansion in application has often 
been accompanied by an unwarranted expansion of the theory itself as 
many courts lose sight of the policies underlying Larsen, ultimately 
resulting in the expansion of liability by these courts and now in the 
proposed Restatement (Third).28 
The federal courts, rather than the state courts, have led the way 
in adopting the enhanced injury theory and in defining its parame-
ters29 under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.30 Many key decisions, 
including Larsen31 Huddell32 Caiazzo33 Mitchell,34 and Fox35 were 
dents of the 10th Circuit, where Fox v. Ford Motor Co. was decided, can collect the bene-
fits." Blankenship, 406 S.E.2d at 786 (citation omitted); see infra notes 58-127 and 
accompanying text. 
22. Eg., Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 890 ¥26 1540,1550 (10th Cir. 1989) (ap-
plying New Mexico law). 
23. Eg.t Howard v. McCrory Corp., 601 R2d 133,137 (4th Cir. 1979) (applying Mary-
land law). 
24. Tafoya v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 884 R2d 1330, 1338 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying 
Colorado law). But see Mile Hi Concrete, Inc. v. Matz, 842 P.2d 198, 206-07 n.17 (Colo. 
1992) (disagreeing with the holding in Tafoya). 
25. Holdsworth v. Nash Mfg., Inc., 409 N.W.2d 764,768 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). For an 
extensive listing of additional products to which plaintiffs have argued the enhanced injury 
doctrine should apply, although not always successfully, see FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra 
note 2, § 21.02, at 21-26 n.l. 
26. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 504; Hoenig, supra note 2, at 647. 
27. Foland, supra note 4, at 621; see also Harris, supra note 4, at 648-49 (noting that 
the concept of recovery for enhanced injury is broad). 
28. See infra notes 79-127. 
29. See, e.g.y Harris, supra note 4, at 644; FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 21.01, 
at 21-24 to 21-26. Hoenig stated: 
In this struggle, [between the Evans and Larsen approaches] the federal courts 
seemed to play an important role as they hazarded "Erie-educated guesses," re-
garding the approach state courts would adopt if faced with the threshold legal 
issue. Nevertheless, since a court opting to follow Larsen will be markedly ex-
tending products liability, the Erie task has been viewed with discomfort. 
Hoenig, supra note 2, at 638-39 (footnotes omitted). 
30. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
31. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). 
32. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976). 
33. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 647 F.2d 241 (2d Gr. 1981). 
34. Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982). 
35. Fox v. Ford Motor Co.. 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978). 
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decided by district and circuit court judges. However, in what some 
have termed a classic example of "the cart leading the horseless car-
riage/' no state court has disagreed with the adoption of the enhanced 
injury theory by the federal judiciary.36 
Although most often applied to alleged design defects, the en-
hanced injury theory is equally applicable to manufacturing or warn-
ing defects.37 Since 1968 and Larsen, the enhanced injury doctrine has 
also been expanded to apply to causes of action based on strict liabil-
ity and breach of warranty theories, as well as negligence.38 However, 
recent developments have seen an increasing rejection of strict liabil-
ity in judging alleged design and warning defects because increasing 
numbers of courts and commentators recognize that a single cause of 
action based on negligence principles and applied through a 
risk-utility balancing test represents the more equitable approach.39 
36. FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 21.02, at 21-26. 
37. See, e.g., Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 398 A2d 490,494 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1979), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., General Motors Corp. v Lahocki, 410 A.2d 
1039 (Md. 1980) (discussing inadequate roof welds); Holdsworth v. Nash Mfg., 409 N.W2d 
764, 767-68 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (discussing manufacturing and testing defects in water 
ski binding); Krein v. Raudabough, 406 N.W.2d 315,320 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (finding in 
a failure to warn case, that dashboard, steering column, and other components of armored 
truck had unreasonably dangerous energy-absorbing properties). 
38. See, e.g., Duran v. General Motors Corp., 688 P.2d 779,782 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) 
(recognizing that crashworthiness claims are actionable in negligence, strict liability, and 
breach of warranty); Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Liability of Manufacturer, Seller, or 
Distributor of Motor Vehicle for Defect Which Merely Enhances Injury From Accident 
Otherwise Caused, 42 AX.R3d 560, § 2[a], at 564 (1972). 
39. See, e.g., Hoenig, supra note 2, at 659-71. Mr. Hoenig stresses that the appropri-
ate predicate for design defect liability is fault and that case law indicates that negligence-
oriented reasonableness criteria must be applied in crash design cases regardless of the 
strict liability label. Id. at 659, 670; see also Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W2d 176, 
185-86 (Mich. 1984) (adopting a negligence risk-utility test in design defect cases); MODEL 
UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,723-24 (1979) 
(noting that courts have never imposed strict liability in a design defect case); Council 
Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 2 cmt. 1, at 49-50 (analyzing the incompatibility of negligence 
and strict liability in regards to the same facts); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE 
LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 644-45 (4th ed. 1971) (discussing the use of negligence principles in 
cases purportedly applying strict liability); Sheila L. Bimbaum, Unmasking the Test for 
Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. 
REV. 593, 603 (1980) (exploring the return to negligence in strict liability actions after 
California rejected the terminology in § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts); James 
A. Henderson, Jr., Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design: Toward 
the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REV. 773,777-78 (1979) (support-
ing separation of strict liability and negligence despite substantially identical cost-benefit 
analysis); Frank J. Vandal!, "Design Defect" in Products Liability: Rethinking Negligence 
and Strict Liability, 43 OHIO ST. LJ. 61, 83-84 (1982) (outlining ten factors of a balancing 
test to be considered in strict liability cases), John W. Wade, On Product "Design Defects" 
and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 551, 577 (1980) (noting combination of negli-
gence, breach of warranty, and strict liability to create a single cause of action). 
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C Elements and Troublesome Developments 
The elements of the enhanced injury claim, whether in negligence 
or in strict liability, are the same as the general elements of any other 
tort claim, requiring the claimant to establish that: (1) the defendant 
owed a duty to the claimant; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) 
the breach was a proximate cause of injury to the claimant; and (4) the 
claimant suffered damage.40 One commentator has modified these 
traditional tort elements to reflect the unique aspects of an enhanced 
injury claim, concluding that an enhanced injury claimant must prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) a "breach of a duty owed to 
the claimant"; (2) that "the breach caused an enhancement of damage 
over and above what would otherwise have occurred"; and (3) "the 
extent to whiich the damage was enhanced as a result of the breach of 
duty."41 Like any other traditional tort claim, the claimant bears the 
burden of proof on each of these elements in order to present a prima 
facie case.42 
For the most part, enhanced injury litigation offers no unique 
problems with respect to these tort elements. However, issues such as 
the burden of proving the extent of the enhanced injury, the perceived 
40. See PROSSER, supra note 39, § 30; Harris, supra note 4, at 651. 
41. Harris, supra note 4, at 657. Mr. Harris has further refined these elements to 
reflect the sequential factual proof that a claimant must offer in order to allow the trier of 
fact to perform the following six functions: 
(1) determine that the defendant breached a duty owed to the claimant; (2) evalu-
ate the full nature, extent, and consequences of the injuries actually received in 
the accident; (3) quantify the severity of the impact imparted to both the object at 
issue and to the person or property injured after impact; (4) define, with a mean-
ingful degree of specificity, the alternative, safer design(s) that claimant alleges 
the defendant should have used; (5) evaluate the full nature, extent, and conse-
quences of the injuries, if any, that the claimant hypo the tically would have suf-
fered in the very same accident if the alternative, safer design had been used; and 
(6) calculate in terms of a damage award the difference be! ween the injuries actu-
ally suffered and those that hypothetically would have been suffered if the alter-
native, safei design had been used. 
Id. at 662. 
42. See Edward T. O'Donneil, Public Policy and the Burden of Proof in Enhanced 
Injury Litigation- A Case Study in the Dangers of Trends and Easy Assumptions, 17 W. ST. 
U. L. REV. 325, 353 (1990) ("Whatever its imperfections, die traditional allocation of the 
burden of proof keeps pressure on each side to come forward with the best evidence it can 
find. A shift in the burden could destroy that balance/'); see also Robert C. Reichert, 
Limitations on Manufacturer Liability in Second Collision Actions, 43 MONT. L. REV. 109, 
115-16 (1982) ("Applying traditional legal principles, the party that initiated the complaint 
and stands to benefit from the proof—the plaintiff—has the burden. In all strict liability 
actions it is the plaintiffs burden to prove the defective design; in second collision cases, 
the plaintiff proves defective design by establishing the existence and magnitude of en-
hanced injuries."). 
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"indivisibility" of some injuries, the "apportionment" of injuries, and 
the imposition of joint and several liability have generated contro-
versy among courts and commentators struggling to equitably define 
and apply the enhanced injury doctrine. 
i. Duty 
Enhanced injury liability is based on the premise that some prod-
ucts, while not made for the purpose of undergoing impacts or becom-
ing involved in accidents, should nevertheless be reasonably designed 
to minimize the potential injury-producing effect of such impacts or 
accidents.43 It is important to note that the duty recognized by the 
Larsen court was limited to reasonable care to protect against unrea-
sonable risks of enhanced injury.44 While foreseeability is an essential 
element in determining the scope of such a duty, it is not synonymous 
with duty.45 In attempting to establish the parameters of a manufac-
turer's duty to minimize the risk of enhanced injury, the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals recognized the limits of foreseeability and 
struggled to provide a rational approach to the question of unreasona-
ble risk in Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk AG., stating: "[Njearly 
every accident situation, [involving an automobile] no matter how bi-
zarre, is 'foreseeable' if only because in the last fifty years drivers have 
discovered just about every conceivable way of wrecking an automo-
bile."46 The court further recognized that the concept of unreasona-
ble risk involves the balancing of many factors and depends to some 
degree upon the circumstances surrounding the particular accident.47 
A manufacturer's duty to minimize the risk of enhanced injury is 
clearly not absolute.48 Thus, many courts have emphasized that man-
ufacturers do not have a duty to produce an "accident-proof'49 or 
"fool-proof50 vehicle, or even one that "floats on water"51 or has the 
"strength and crash-damage resistance features of an M-2 Army 
43. Harris, supra note 4, at 646. 
44. Larsen, 391 R2d at 502. 
45. Harris, supra note 4, at 654; Hoenig, supra note" 2, at 638 n.19; Kelly Carbetta-
Scandy, Note, Litigating Enhanced Injury Cases: Complex Issues, Empty Precedents, and 
Unpredictable Results, 54 CINN. L. REV. 1257,1275 (1986). 
46. 489 R2d 1066,1070 (4th Or. 1974) (citing Michael Hoenig & Stephen J. Werber, 
Automobile "Crashworthiness": An Untenable Doctrine, 1971 INS. LJ. 583, 595). 
47. Id. at 1071; see also discussion of Dreisonstok and its duty analysis in Poland, supra 
note 4, at 605-06; Carbetta-Scandy, supra note 45, at 1275. 
48. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 503; Harris, supra note 4, at 652; Carbetta-Scandy, supra note 
45, at 1275. 
49. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 502. 
50. Guazzo,647F.2dat247. 
51. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 502. 
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tank."52 Ultimately, the question of the scope of a manufacturer's 
duty is one of fairness.53 
2. Defect 
Once it is established that the manufacturer owed a duty to the 
claimant, the claimant must show a breach of that duty by proving the 
existence of a defect.54 An enhanced injury claimant must prove the 
existence of a design defect by showing that a reasonable alternative 
design, practicable under the circumstances, would have provided bet-
ter protection against enhanced injuries in an accident.55 Most courts 
and commentators agree that a plaintiff alleging a design defect must 
present qualitative evidence of a safer, alternative design which not 
only must have been possible, but must have been practicably feasible 
or reasonably achievable under technology available at the time of the 
product's manufacture.56 The requirement of proof of the existence 
of a reasonable alternative design does not enlarge the plaintiffs bur-
den of proof, as plaintiffs have always borne the burden of proving the 
existence of a defect, and proof of a reasonable alternative design is 
merely a part of that burden.57 
3. Burden of Proof 
Following the rationale of Larsen, most jurisdictions expressly 
recognize that the manufacturer is potentially liable only for the en-
hanced injuries over and above those that would have occurred absent 
the alleged defect, and that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving 
that the alleged defect caused the enhanced injuries.58 However, con-
52. Roberts v. May, 583 P.2d 305, 308 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978) (quoting Melia v. Ford 
Motor Co., 534 R2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976) (Bright, J., dissenting)). 
53. Harris, supra note 4, at 655. 
54. Because the vast majority of enhanced injury cases involve claims of design defect, 
the following discussion will focus on proof of design defects, rather than manufacturing 
defects which are proven by a relatively straightforward showing that the product as manu-
factured did not conform to the manufacturing specifications. 
55. Hoenig, supra note 2, at 634 n.3. 
56. Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 2 cmt. c, at 22-28 and cmt d, at 28-34; Hoe-
nig, supra note 2, at 637 n.17,685; Stanton P. Beck, Comment,, Enhanced Injury: A Direc-
tion for Washington, 61 WASH. L. REV. 571,590 (1986); Carbetta-Scandy, supra note 45, at 
1264 n36. Contra Kudlacek v. Hat S.p.A.. 509 N.W.2d 603,611 (Neb. 1994) ("Nebraska no 
longer requires proof of an alternative design for a claimant to recover under a claim of 
defective design"). 
57. Hoenig, supra note 2, at 688. 
58. FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 21.04[1], at 21-35; James O. Pearson, Jr., 
Annotation, Products Liability: Sufficiency of Proof of Injuries Resulting From "Second 
Collision," 9 A L.R.4th 494 § 2, at 497 (1981); Foland, supra note 4, at 608-09; Harris, 
supra note 4, at 656; Levenstam & Lapp, supra note 19, at 62; Reichert, supra note 42, at 
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troversy has arisen over the way in which the plaintiffs burden of 
proof of causation may be met. In fact, the question of who should 
bear the burden of proving the extent of enhanced injuries has gener-
ated more controversy than any other single issue arising out of the 
enhanced injury doctrine. 
Decisions faithful to the theoretical underpinnings of the en-
hanced injury theory require proof of the extent of enhanced injuries 
as a part of the plaintiffs prima facie case.59 The seminal case adopt-
ing this approach is Huddell v. Levin.60 In this case Dr. Huddel! was 
sitting in his Chevrolet Nova after it had run out of gas on a bridge. 
Shortly thereafter, his car was struck from behind by another vehicle 
traveling at a speed of fifty to sixty miles per hour.61 The impact alleg-
edly forced Dr. HuddelFs head back into the head restraint, resulting 
in a fatal skull fracture.62 Huddell's widow brought suit against the 
manufacturer, claiming that the defective design of the head restraint 
caused her husband's death. In reversing a jury verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that enhanced 
injury cases "require a highly refined and almost invariably difficult 
presentation of proof'63 which the plaintiff had failed to sustain, 
including: 
1. that there existed at the time of the accident, an alternative, 
safer, more practicable product design; 
2. that plaintiff would have sustained a less severe injury had 
such alternative design been used, by offering proof of what 
injuries, if any, would have been sustained with the alterna-
tive design; and 
3. a method of establishing the extent of enhanced injury attrib-
utable to the design defect.64 
In a concurring opinion that would eventually become quite influ-
ential, Judge Rosenn objected to the majority's second and third re-
quirements of proof on the basis that there may be circumstances 
under which they would be "unreasonably burdensome to an innocent 
113-14; Carbetta-Scandy, supra note 45, at 1258; Kerry A. Shad, Note, Warren v. Colombo: 
North Carolina Recognizes Claim for Enhanced Injury, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1330,1338 (1990); 
see also Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762,774 (5th Or. 1976); RichaTdson v. 
Volkswagenwerk A.G., 552 R Supp. 73, 81-83 (W.D. Mo. 1982). 
59. Harris, supra note 4, at 657. 
60. 537 F.2d 726, 737-38 (3d Cir. 1976) (applying New Jersey law). 
61. la\ at 732. 
62. Id at 731. An autopsy showed that Dr. Huddell suffered no other significant inju-
ries in the collision. Id, 
63. Id at 737. 
64. Id. at 737-38. 
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plaintiff/'65 Judge Rosenn believed that the wrongdoer causing the 
initial accident and the wrongdoer causing the enhanced injury should 
instead be treated as "concurrent tortfeasors," with the burden of 
proving apportionment of injury shifting to the defendant pursuant to 
section 433B;(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.66 
The Huddell majority, on the other hand, did not perceive that 
enhanced injury litigation fit into the concepts of concurrent 
tortfeasor actions which combine, contemporaneously, to cause an in-
jury.67 Instead, the court emphasized that "[analogies to concurrent 
actions combining to cause a single impact are simply not applicable" 
where the driver who caused the original impact is liable for all of the 
injuries, and the manufacturer is liable only for the enhanced 
injuries.68 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reached the same conclu-
sion in Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk AG.69 This case involved a Volk-
swagen minibus which was rear-ended by a car traveling at a speed of 
fifty to sixty-five miles per hour. The collision caused the minibus to 
spin and roll over, ejecting the Caiazzos, who were unrestrained, and 
causing them serious injury.70 In reversing a jury verdict in favor of 
65. Id at 7<M (Rosenn, J., concurring). 
66. Id at 745. Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: 
[WJhere the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring about 
harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to limit his liability on 
the ground that the harm is capable of apportionment among them, the burden of 
proof as to the apportionment is upon each such actor. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(2) (1965). 
This approach has been criticized as an example of courts: 
mistakenly abdicating] [their] responsibility . . . , failing to engage in a critical 
analysis of either the Restatement rule or the theoretical basis on which the sec-
ond collision doctrine rests. The Restatement requires a defendant to go forward 
with proof of apportionment because he is the one who seeks to rely on it to 
relieve himself of liability for all or a portion of the damages. However, in a 
second colliirion-crashworthy case, the defendant has no liability absent proof of 
enhanced injury. Therefore the plaintiff is the one who relies on proof of appor-
tionment to establish his cause of action. 
Poland, supra note 4, at 615. Moreover, if courts are going to look to the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts for guidance in enhanced injury cases, other provisions and their com-
ments are instructive, such as § 879 (dealing with liability for concurring or consecutive 
independent acts; comment b makes clear that this section does not apply in an enhanced 
injury setting) and §§ 323 and 324A (dealing with the liability of one providing a service, 
rather than a product, for increased risk of harm to the claimant or his property). 
67. Huddell, 537 R2d at 738. 
68. Id\ see abo Shad, supra note 58, at 1338 (arguing that the principles of joint and 
several liability require the manufacturer be held liable only for the enhanced injury, not 
the entire injury). 
69. 647 F2cl 241, 252 (2d Cur. 1981) (applying New York law). 
70. Id at 243-44. 
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the plaintiffs due to insufficient proof, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled that "the plaintiff should be required to prove the ex-
tent of the enhanced injuries attributable to the defective design"71 
and that proof requires a showing of the actual nature and extent of 
the injuries aggravated.72 The court felt that the theoretical underpin-
nings of the enhanced injury doctrine require the plaintiff to sustain 
this burden in order to avoid speculation.73 
The Huddell-Caiazzo approach has been followed by many juris-
dictions74 and has been widely praised by commentators as consistent 
with both the theoretical underpinnings of Larsen and with broader 
themes of product liability law.75 The Huddell and Caiazzo courts 
71. Id. at 250. 
72. Id. at 251. 
73. Id. at 246. 
74. See, eg., O'Bryan v. Volkswagen of Am., 39 F3d 1182,1994 WL 599450, at *4 (6th 
Or. Nov. 1,1994) (applying Kentucky law in an unpublished disposition); Chretien v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 231,1992 WL 67356, at *9 (4th Cir. Apr. 6,1992) (applying 
Virginia law in an unpublished disposition); Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 890 R2d 
1540, 1546 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying New Mexico law); Barris v. Bob's Drag Chutes & 
Safety Equip., Inc., 685 F.2d 94,100 (3d Cir. 1982) (applying Pennsylvania law); Seese v. 
Volkswagenwerk A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 844-49 (3d Cir.) (applying North Carolina law), cert 
denied, 454 U.S. 867 (1981); Curtis v. General Motors Corp., 649 R2d 808, 813 (10th Cir. 
1981) (applying Colorado law); Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950,960 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(applying New Jersey law), cert denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981); Stonehocker v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 587 R2d 151,158 (4th Or. 1978) (applying South Carolina law); Higginbotham 
v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762,773-74 (5th Cir. 1976) (applying Georgia law); Endicott 
v. Nissan Motor Corp., 141 Cal. Rptr. 95,100-01 (Ct. App. 1977); Mastennan v. Veldman's 
Equip., Inc., 530 N.E.2d 312,317 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Reed v. Chrysler Corp., 494 N.W.2d 
224. 226 (Iowa 1992); Hillrichs v. Avco Corp., 478 N.W2d 70, 75 (Iowa 1991); Wernimont 
v. International Harvester Corp., 309 N.W.2d 137, 140-41 (Iowa Ct. App. 1981); Arm-
strong v. Lorino, 580 So. 2d 528, 530 (La. Ct. App. 1991); Andrews v. Harley Davidson, 
Inc., 796 P.2d 1092, 1095 (Nev. 1990); McLaughlin v. Nissan Motor Corp., 630 A.2d 857, 
860 (N J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993); Duran v. General Motors Corp., 688 P.2d 779,786^87 
(N.M. Ct. App. 1983); Garcia v. Rivera, 553 N.Y.S.2d 378, 380 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); 
Cornier v. Spagna, 475 N.Y.S.2d 7, 10 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft 
Corp., 577 F26 1322,1326 (Or. 1978); Kupetz v. Deere & Co., 644 A.2d 1213,1218 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1994); Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp., 522 ?2d 829, 833-34 (Wash. 
1974); see also pre-Htiddell decisions: Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 489 F.2d 
1066, 1074-76 (4th Or. 1974) (applying Virginia law); Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349, 
1361 (M.D. Pa. 1978), affd, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Pennsylvania law); 
Yetter v. Rajeski, 364 F. Supp. 105, 107-09 (D.NJ. 1973) (applying New Jersey law); 
LiPuma v. County of Rockland, 367 N.Y.S.2d 149,153 (N.Y. Sup. Q. 1975). 
75. FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 21.04[1], at 21-26 (stating that the Huddell 
approach clearly represents uthe current and better view** and is eminently fair to all liti-
gants in that it places the burden of proof where it properly belongs, on the plaintiff, to 
prove with particularity the injuries that have been enhanced); Poland, supra note 4, at 
613-16; Harris, supra note 4, at 660-65; Hoenig, supra note 2, at 69£-706; Levenstam & 
Lapp, supra note 19, at 75; O'Donnell, supra note 42, at 330-36; Reichert, supra note 42, at 
114-16; Nicholas J. Wittner, Crashworthiness Litigation: Principles and Proofs 1992, (PLI 
Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H4-5145,1992); Carbetta-Scandy, 
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properly recognized that the plaintiff asserting an enhanced injury 
claim must prove the extent of the injuries enhanced by the alleged 
product defect, as well as the injuries which would have been caused 
by the reasonable alternative design, in order to establish' the exis-
tence of a defect, proximate causation, and thus, liability.76 In other 
words, there can be no liability unless there is a difference between 
the actual injury sustained and the hypothetical injury which would 
have been expected to occur under the same circumstances had the 
design been different.77 If a claimant fails to prove that the injuries 
sustained were aggravated beyond that which would have occurred 
had a safer alternative design been used, the claimant fails to prove 
the fact of enhancement.78 
However, perceived difficulties of proof under the enhanced in-
jury doctrine have led some jurisdictions to stray from the theoretical 
supra note 45, at 1264-69; Jo Anne Clark, Note, Second Collision Liability: A Critique of 
Two Approaches to Plaintiffs Burden of Proof 68 IOWA L. REV. 811, 812, 815-19 (1983); 
Shad, supra note 58, at 1337-38. But see Gerald F. Tietz et al., Crashworthiness and Erie: 
Determining State Law Regarding the Burden of Proving and Apportioning Damages, 62 
TEMP. L. REV. 587, 604 (1989) (suggesting that in requiring the plaintiff to prove the exact 
extent to which each tortfeasor's conduct caused injury, the Huddell court increased the 
plaintiffs traditional burden of proof and created a new and more burdensome prima facie 
case not required in other strict liability actions; moreover, the necessity of conjectural 
evidence converts a crashworthiness action into a trial of a hypothetical case, inviting sup-
position and speculation by the jury); Beck, supra note 56, alt 581-85, 596 (rejecting the 
Huddell approach as unfair and too harsh, although the author does recognize the inappli-
cability of concurrent tortfeasor and joint and several liability concepts under the Larsen 
holding which in effect precludes the possibility of finding a manufacturer jointly and sev-
erally liable for all damages except perhaps in the rare case where the defective design can 
be shown to have caused all the injuries). 
However, the Tietz article wrongly predicted that Pennsylvania state courts would not 
follow Huddell. Tietz et al., supra at 581; see Kupetz v. Deere & Co., 644 A.2d 1213,1219 
(Pa. Super. Ct. J 994), discussed infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text. 
76. Clark, supra note 75, at 817-18; Reichert, supra note 42, at 114. Mr. Reichert 
explains that because the alleged defective design is the cause of enhanced injuries, absent 
enhanced injuries, there is no defect. Thus, proof of enhanced injuries implies the exis-
tence of the defect and a causal relationship between the defect and enhanced injuries. 
Because "enhanced" is a relative term, the claimant must compare the injuries allegedly 
caused by the defective design with the injuries he probably would have suffered had the 
manufacturer used an equally feasible design. Only those injuries that are greater than the 
injuries that would have resulted had a proper design been used are compensable as en-
hanced injuries. Id. 
77. O'Donnell, supra note 42, at 339; Hoenig, supra note 2, at 692. Mr. Hoenig ex-
plains that a claimant must prove that the alleged defect proximately caused enhanced 
injury; there must be a nexus between the defect and the injuries incurred. "Generally, the 
existence of such a nexus is proved through a showing that if a .different design had been 
used, enhanced injuries would not have occurred." Id. 
78. Carbetta-Scandy, supra note 45, at 1276; see also Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk 
A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 1981) (applying New York law). 
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and policy underpinnings justifying application of the theory, which 
has resulted in an increasing uncertainty in the law and an unwar-
ranted increase in the scope of the manufacturer's liability.79 Fox v. 
Ford Motor Co.80 is often relied upon as a seminal case in support of 
the so-called "substantial factor" approach.81 In Fox, two rear-seat 
passengers were killed in a head-on collision with a truck which had 
crossed over the center line on an icy road.82 Both passengers were 
wearing lap belts and received fatal abdominal and spinal injuries. 
The plaintiffs alleged that the design of the rear seat belts was defec-
tive in both the angle of the lap belts and the absence of shoulder 
belts.S3 The defendant manufacturer argued that the lap belts were 
properly positioned and that the severity of the injuries was due to the 
high speed of the crash.84 
In affirming jury verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs, the Fox court 
determined that Wyoming would adopt the enhanced injury doctrine 
but rejected Huddell as refusing to follow orthodox principles of joint 
liability of concurrent tortfeasors for injuries which flow from their 
concurring in a single impact.85 The court saw no difference between 
an enhanced injury case and one in which a passive tortfeasor and an 
active tortfeasor "cooperate" to produce an injury.86 Citing section 
433A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts*7 the court held that dam-
79. Clark, supra note 75, at 812; Carbetta-Scandy, supra note 45, at 1272. 
80. 575 R2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978) (applying Wyoming law). 
81. The phrase "substantial factor" is actually nothing more than the stock language 
which is set out in the general proximate cause instruction given by federal courts in ordi-
nary tort cases. Harris, supra note 4, at 658 n.108. 
82. Fox, 575 F.2d at 777. 
83. Id at 778. 
84. la\ 
85. Id at 787. 
86. Id 
87. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A provides: 
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes where 
(a) there are distinct harms, or 
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause 
to a single harm. 
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or more 
causes. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965). 
Comment i explains further. 
Certain kinds of harm, by their very nature, are normally incapable of any logical, 
reasonable or practical division By far the greater number of personal inju-
ries, and of harms to tangible property, are . . . single and indivisible. Where two 
or more causes combine to produce such a single result, incapable of division on 
any logical or reasonable basis, and each is a substantial factor in bringing about 
the harm, the courts have refused to make an arbitrary apportionment for its own 
sake, and each of the causes is charged with responsibility for the entire harm. 
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ages are to be apportioned between the two tortfeasors "if there are 
distinct harms or a reasonable basis for deteirmining the causes of 
injury/'88 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals thus held that once a plaintiff 
shows that the alleged design defect was a substantial factor in pro-
ducing injuries over and above those which would have resulted ab-
sent the defect, the burden shifts to the manufacturer to "apportion"89 
the injuries if possible. Yet the court further reasoned that apportion-
ment is neither appropriate nor possible where an injury is "indivisi-
ble/*90 such as death or paralysis, and in that case, the defendants will 
be jointly and severally liable for all injuries.91 
Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk A.G.92 is another case often relied 
upon in support of the view that a plaintiff need only prove that the 
alleged defect was a substantial factor in producing enhanced injuries 
before the burden of proof of enhancement shifts to the defendant 
manufacturer. In Mitchell, an unrestrained front-seat passenger was 
ejected from the car in which he was riding as it left the road, struck 
an embankment and overturned.93 The driver, who was not ejected, 
suffered only minor injuries, while Mitchell was rendered a paraple-
gic.94 The plaintiff asserted that he was ejected through the passenger 
door which had a defectively designed door latch and was rendered a 
paraplegic after his ejection from the vehicle. The defendant manu-
facturer countered that Mitchell was ejected through the rear window, 
rather than the passenger door, and suffered the paraplegic injury 
while still in the vehicle during the rollover. 
On appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff which ap-
portioned damages between the driver and the manufacturer, the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the jury should 
not have been allowed to apportion an indivisible injury such as para-
plegia.95 If the plaintiff is able to show that a design defect was a 
substantial factor in producing an indivisible injury, the manufacturer 
should be jointly and severally liable for all damages. Despite its rec-
ognition that the manufacturer in an enhanced injury case should only 
Id § 433A cmt. i, at 43£-40. 
88. Fox, 575 R2d at 787. 
89. See infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text regarding the falsity of the "appor-
tionment** and "indivisibility" issues. 
90. See infra notes 121-25. 
91. Fox, 575 E2d at 787. 
92. 669 E2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying Minnesota law). 
93. Id. at 1201. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 1201-02. 
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be liable for the enhanced injuries, the court held that the plaintiff 
should not bear the burden of proving that the manufacturer was the 
"sole cause" of the enhanced injury.96 
The Mitchell court indicated that its primary difficulty with Hud-
dell and its progeny was with forcing the parties and the jury "to try a 
hypothetical case/'97 Thus, the court characterized the Huddell-
Caiazzo approach as "proving the impossible."98 
Although the Fox-Mitchell approach has been followed,99 it has 
also been criticized on the ground that it is an erosion of the principles 
asserted in Larsen and unfairly extends manufacturers* potential lia-
bility far beyond enhanced injury to all injury sustained in an accident 
which the manufacturer played no part in creating.100 Importantly, 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, seeking to clarify its previous 
holding in Fox, substantially modified that decision in Harvey v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp,101 
In Harvey, the plaintiff suffered an amputated leg and brain dam-
age when the 1979 Chevrolet Corvette in which he was riding swerved 
from the road at high speed and rolled over. Harvey alleged that the 
Corvette's "T-Top" roof panels separated from the car during the rol-
lover, allowing him to be ejected and causing his injuries. Although 
96. Mat 1203. 
97. la\ at 1204. C/. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 
1981); supra note 69-73 and accompanying text. The Caiazzo court was similarly con-
cerned that the Fox-Mitchell approach forces the manufacturer to show a "plethora of hy-
pothetical and speculative possibilities," forces the manufacturer to prove a part of the 
plaintiffs case, and allows the jury to engage in undue speculation which tempts them to 
assign liability on the basis of the deep pockets of the manufacturer. Caiazzoy 647 F.2d at 
246. 
98. Mitchell, 669 F.2d at 1203. 
99. See, e.g., Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418,424 (5th Cir. 1985) (apply-
ing Texas law); McLeod v. American Motors Corp., 723 ¥2d 830, 833-34 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(applying Florida law); Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co., 590 F.2d 215,217 (7th Cir. 1978) (apply-
ing Wisconsin law); Smith v. Fiat-Roosevelt Motors, Inc., 556 F>2d 728,730 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(applying Florida law); Richardson v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 552 F. Supp. 73, 83 (W.D. 
Mo. 1982); Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 646 P2d 1020,1024 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982); 
Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 398 A.2d 490,500 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979), rev'd 
on other grounds sub nom. General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 410 A.2d 1039 (Md. 1980); 
Lee v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 688 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Okla. 1984); Sumnicht v. Toyota 
Motor Sales USA, Inc., 360 N.W.2d 2,10 (Wis. 1984); Maskrey v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 
370 N.W.2d 815, 821 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985); Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123, 
1131 (Wyo. 1978). 
100. See FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 21.04[4], at 21-35; Levenstam & Lapp, 
supra note 19; Carbetta-Scandy, supra note 45, at 1267-68; Clark, supra note 75, at 820,824 
("Mitchell illustrates the mental gymnastics in which courts engage when forced to inter-
pret [the] words [of Larsen].n). 
101. 873 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying Wyoming law). 
HeinOnlme - 36 S Tex L Rev 433 1995 
434 SOUTH TEXAS LA W REVIEW [Vol. 36:417 
the jury found that the vehicle was defective, that General Motors was 
negligent, and that the defect caused the plaintiffs injuries, it did not 
award plaintiff any damages, apparently believing that Harvey "did 
not establish the extent of enhanced injuries attributable to the defec-
tive design of the Corvette . . . ."102 
The court of appeals upheld this verdict, finding that Harvey had 
not sustained his burden of proving enhancement because he never 
established that his injuries were over and above those which would 
have been sustained had the T-Top remained in place.103 The court 
went on to criticize misinterpretations of the Fox decision, stating: "In 
our view, Fox does not tell us that a finding of causation necessitates 
an award of damages. Rather, Fox permits apportionment of damages 
if there are distinct harms or there is a reasonable basis for determin-
ing the causes of injury."104 
Consequently, Harvey reveals that it is not enough to prove that a 
defect caused or was a "substantial factor" in producing an injury. A 
plaintiff must prove that a defect caused injury "over and above" the 
injury that probably would have occurred absent the alleged defect.105 
Thus, a plaintiff must prove the injury that "probably would have oc-
curred."106 As one commentator has stated, "i1 is not unreasonable to 
read [the Harvey] opinion as requiring the plaintiff to prove the dam-
ages he would have suffered but for the injury enhancing defect, mov-
ing the Tenth Circuit closer to HuddelVs third element of proof than 
to Fox"™1 Others also view Harvey as marking "a critical shift in the 
weight of authority and a reaffirmation of traditional requirements of 
proof, both quantitative and qualitative."108 Thus, reliance on what 
has been labeled the "Fox-Mitchell" approach is misplaced. 
Moreover, the Fox-Mitchell analysis is flawed in that it allows a 
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case despite inadequate and specu-
lative proof of proximate cause.109 It is this gross assumption that lia-
bility has already been fixed that supports the application of 
traditional principles of concurrent tortfeasors and joint and several 
102. Id. ait 1348. 
103. Id. alt 1350. 
104. Id. ait 1349. 
105. Id. (citing Larsen, 391 F.2d at 503). 
106. Winner, supra note 75. 
107. FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 21.04[3], at 21-44 n.66. 
108. O'Donnell, supra noie 42, at 328. 
109. See Carbetta-Scandy, supra note 45, at 1267; Clark, supra note 75, at 827; see also 
Levenstam & Lapp, supra note 19, at 79-80, 82 ("Liability without fault never was in-
tended to be construed as liability without causation."). 
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liability to neatly resolve the issue of apportionment.110 However, the 
analogy completely ignores the fact that a finding of defect in an en-
hanced injury case must include the jury's determination that defined, 
specific injuries were unreasonably enhanced.111 In other words, in 
enhanced injury cases, proof of causation and proof of enhancement 
are inseparable.112 The substantial factor approach, while requiring 
proof of a reasonable alternative design, does not require proof of the 
extent of the plaintiffs injuries absent the alleged defect. Thus, the 
approach does not require actual proof of enhancement, thereby re-
lieving the plaintiff of the burden of proving a causal relationship be-
tween the defect and the injury, effectively removing the element of 
causation, and leaving the plaintiff's case in a morass of speculation.113 
While some argue that the concern the Fox-Mitchell approach ex-
presses for plaintiffs faced with difficult issues of proof is legitimate, 
equally legitimate is the concern that enhanced injury defendants re-
ceive fair treatment through the weeding out of those cases lacking a 
sufficient evidentiary foundation.114 Attacks on the Huddell-Caiazzo 
approach often revolve around a perceived difficulty of plaintiffs in 
retaining and compensating the expert witnesses usually necessary to 
prove an enhanced injury claim.115 Such arguments are exaggerated 
and unfounded. Case law illustrates that plaintiffs do succeed in satis-
fying the standards enunciated by Huddell and Caiazzo.116 Indeed, no 
commentator has offered evidence that any deserving plaintiff has lost 
110. Clark, supra note 75, at 827; Levenstam & Lapp, supra note 19, at 82. 
111. See Levenstam & Lapp, supra note 19, at 82; Clark, supra note 75, at 827. 
112. Foland, supra note 4, at 612; Levenstam & Lapp, supra note 19, at 76, 83-34. 
113. See Levenstam & Lapp, supra note 19, at 80. 
114. See Harris, supra note 4, at 659 n.118; Carbetta-Scandy, supra note 45, at 1267. 
Mr. Harris further notes that the plaintiffs burden of proving the extent of enhancement is 
not impossible or unfair, the theoretical underpinnings of the enhanced injury concept cre-
ate a practicable balance between the interests of plaintiffs and defendants. Harris, supra 
note 4, at 663. 
115. In an enhanced injury case, expert testimony \s normally required in areas such as 
occupant kinematics, biomechanics, human impact tolerance, accident reconstruction, en-
gineering, medicine, etc. See Foland, supra note 4, at 617; Carbetta-Scandy, supra note 45, 
at 1277. In order to present a jury issue, it is not sufficient to merely present expert testi-
mony that the accident was "survivable" absent the defect or that the injury ."probably" 
would have been reduced by a design change. See Foland, supra note 4, at 617. 
116. See O'Donnell, supra note 42, at 334 n.51; see also Seese v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 
648 F.2d 833,845 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 867 (1981) (applying the Huddell standard 
to alternative design, injury causation, and injury enhancement evidence). 
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a specific case for lack of an expert witness over the past twenty 
years.117 
Argument about the difficulty the plaintiff faces in proving a hy-
pothetical case is equally unfounded. In products liability litigation, 
both plaintiffs and defendants routinely retain experts who are able to 
reach opinions about hypothetical injuries.118 Thus, the assertion that 
juries are unable to perform the complex calculations required to 
evaluate and separate enhanced injuries is ludicrous.119 The vener-
able Larsen court was not concerned about this fair requirement of 
proof. Recognizing that identification of enhanced injuries or dam-
ages may at times be difficult, the court nevertheless stated that the 
obstacles are not insurmountable, noting that similar apportionments 
are performed with regularity under comparative negligence 
statutes.1^ 
The concepts of "apportionment" and "indivisible injury/' bor-
rowed by the Fox-Mitchell approach from anachronistic principles of 
concurrent tortfeasor liability, are simply not applicable in an en-
hanced injury case.121 This is because the very nature of the relief 
sought by the plaintiff must be based on the divisibility of the injury. 
117. O'Donnell, supra note 42, at 345. (pointing out that whatever was true years ago, 
today products liability litigation offers great monetary rewards to the plaintiffs bar and its 
allied experts). 
118. An example of this may be seen in the assertion of the seat belt defense where 
defendants are regularly required to prove the hypothetical injuries which would have oc-
curred had the plaintiff been wearing a seat belt and to compare those to the injuries 
actually received. See FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 21.04[4], at 21-52. See gener-
ally Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G , 647 F.2d 241 (2d Ciir. 1981). 
119. Indeed, the performance of such apportionment calculations is far more common 
today than it was in 1968 at the time of Larsen. Juries have little difficulty with either the 
fact or the reality of assessing comparative fault among parties using numerous different 
formulae. See FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 2l.04[l], at 21-35 n.7, § 21.04(4), at 
21-52. 
120. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 503. 
Triers of fact are allowed to make similar inexact determinations in returning 
awards in personal injury cases involving pain and suffering, in resolving wrongful 
death cases in which young children's net lifetime earnings are projected, in set-
ting condemnation awards, in making comparative negligence determinations, 
and in business interruption and lost profits lawsuits in which the trier hypotheti-
cally must determine what profits would have been earned absent the defendant's 
wrongful conduct. 
Harris, supra note 4, at 664-65. Perhaps use of the term "apportionment" was an unfortu-
nate choice by the Larsen court in that it has bred a great deal of confusion among courts 
struggling to determine exactly what must be apportioned. See infra notes 121-25 and 
accompanying text. 
121. See Hoenig, supra note 2, at 704. "When viewed in [its] elemental form, the plain-
tiffs enhancement burden of proof is nothing more than a requirement to prove that which 
he is claiming: that 'fewer* or 'lesser' injuries would have occurred with a different design. 
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The apportionment that is demanded is not a division among the total 
injuries which the plaintiff sustained, but rather a showing of the dif-
ference between the injuries actually incurred and the injuries that 
would have resulted in the accident absent the alleged defect.122 Or, 
as Michael Hoenig has argued for many years, the debate over the 
apportionment or the indivisibility of death or paralysis is a false con-
troversy and a basic conceptual error.123 The manufacturer cannot be 
liable for the entire harm under any theory. Instead the plaintiff must 
show some basis for a comparison of the actual injury to that different 
and lesser harm which would have occurred had the design been dif-
ferent. If the plaintiff does not supply that proof, then a basic element 
of the tort is lacking.124 
For the same reasons, section 433B(2) of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts is inapplicable because it merely speaks to the situation 
of proven multiple tortfeasors apportioning total harm among them-
selves and does not relate to the plaintiffs burden of proving en-
hanced injuries.125 Section 433B was drafted in the context of joint 
and several liability and was designed to ease the plaintiffs burden of 
proof at a time when comparative negligence on the part of the plain-
tiff would bar recovery. In light of the widespread adoption of com-
parative fault principles, such rules are no longer necessary. 
Placing the burden of proving enhancement on the manufacturer 
encourages litigation because every auto accident injury is in reality a 
"second collision" injury, prompting plaintiffs with nothing to lose to 
join manufacturers as defendants in every case.126 The nuisance value 
of such claims is also increased when defendants must bear the risk of 
failing to sustain the burden of enhancement. In addition, even in the 
face of speculative proof, defendants are forced to bear the costs of 
expensive accident reconstruction and medical testimony. Increased 
litigation and long, complex trials result in increased costs and strain 
The plaintiffs burden, therefore, is not one of apportioning harms or dividing up injuries 
" Id. 
122. Hoenig, supra note 2, at 704; see also Levenstaro & Lapp, supra note 19, at 84 
(arguing that the plaintiff cannot have it both ways by relying on the divisibility of the 
injury in order to establish liability against the manufacturer for the enhanced injuries, but 
then arguing that the injury is indivisible in order to hold the manufacturer jointly and 
severally liable for the entire harm). 
123. Hoenig, supra note 2, at 700-01 n.292,703-05; O'Donneil, supra note 42, at 336. 
As Hoenig argues, it is understandable that judges have found the apportionment of death 
or paralysis between a first and second collision difficult since such apportionment was 
never in issue in the first place. Hoenig, supra note 2, at 700-01 n.292. 
124. Hoenig, supra note 2, at 703-05; O'Donneil, supra note 42, at 336. 
125. Hoenig, supra note 2, at 704-05. 
126. O'Donneil, supra note 42, at 352 n.117; Reichert, supra note 42, at 116. 
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on the already overburdened judicial system. All of these costs, natu-
rally termed "indirect insurance" by some, are ultimately passed on to 
consumers and taxpayers.127 
4. Comparative Fault 
A second area of controversy in enhanced injury theory arises 
surrounding the applicability of the defense of comparative fault. The 
modern trend in products liability is toward consolidating defenses 
and allowing the unitary defense of comparative fault as an award-
reducing, rather than an absolute, defense.128 In enhanced injury 
cases, it is widely accepted that a plaintiffs fault which is a proximate 
cause of enhanced injury,129 such as failure to wear a seatbelt, should 
always be compared to a defendant manufacturer's injury-enhancing 
fault.130 There is no debate over the conclusion that the responsibility 
to use reasonable care to ensure that injuries are not enhanced applies 
equally to both manufacturers and consumers.131 
The controversy arises over whether a plaintiff's accident-causing 
fault should also be compared to a defendant manufacturer's injury-
enhancing fault. Some jurisdictions and commentators have taken the 
position that a plaintiffs negligence in causing an accident cannot be 
compared to a defendant's injury-enhancing fault.132 They argue that 
127. O'Donnell, supra note 42, at 352 n.117; Reichert, supra note 42, at 116. 
128. Harris, supra note 4, at 672-73; Reichert, supra note 42, at 122; Shad, supra note 
58, at 1340. But see Kupetz v. Deere & Co., 644 A.2d 1213,1221 (Pa. Super. Q . 1994) 
(finding that a plaintiffs contributory negligence may not be utilized to apportion fault 
between the plaintiff and defendant in an enhanced injury or any other type of products 
liability action). Some states do still allow the assertion of affirmative defenses such as 
misuse. See States v. R.D. Werner Co., 799 P.2d 427, 430 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding 
that if misuse was sole cause of plaintiffs injuries, plaintiff cannot recover under strict 
products liability theory). 
129. A plaintiff has injury-enhancing fault when he fails to conduct himself in a reason-
able manner to avoid unnecessary injury in the event of an accident, or, in other words, 
when a plaintiff s action or inaction is a contributing proximate cause of his enhanced inju-
ries. Reichert, supra note 42, at 120. 
130. See Poland, supra note 4, at 620; Harris, supra note 4, at 674; Reichert, supra note 
42, at 117; Carbetta-Scandy, supra note 45, at 1280-84; Shad, supra note 58, at 1340; see 
also MacDonald v. Genera! Motors Corp., 784 F. Supp. 486, 500 (M.D. Ttenn. 1992) (find-
ing evidence of plaintiffs failure to wear seat belt admissible to support defendant's argu-
ment that the plaintiffs fault was the proximate cause of his injuries rather than the alleged 
defect, notwithstanding state statute precluding seat belt defense as evidence of contribu-
tory negligence). 
131. See Carbetta-Scandy, supra note 45, at 1280. 
132. See Harris, supra note 4, at 672-73; Shad, supra note 5St at 1340; Reichert, supra 
note 42, at 117-18,125; MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, reprinted in 44 Fed. 
Reg. 62,714, at 62,736 (1979); see also Reed v. Chrysler Corp., 494 N.W.2d 224, 230 (Iowa 
1992) (holding that evidence of driver's or plaintiff passenger's intoxication at time of acci-
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this result is implicit in the holding of Larsen which established a new 
precedent by holding the manufacturer liable for enhanced injuries 
even though the defect did not cause the initial accident.133 
However, a careful analysis of case law and commentary demon-
strates that a significant number of courts have concluded that all of a 
plaintiffs fault must be compared to the injury-enhancing fault of the 
product manufacturer as long as it can be established that the plain-
tiffs fault was a proximate cause of the enhanced injury.134 The rea-
sons advanced for this position include the fact that the defense of 
comparative fault is a consideration distinct from the plaintiffs bur-
den of proving causation of the injuries. With proper instruction, ju-
ries have no difficulty in assigning percentages of causal fault— 
whether it be accident-causing or injury-enhancing—to all parties 
whose conduct proximately contributed to the plaintiffs injuries. In 
addition, refusing to allow comparison of all of a plaintiffs negligent 
conduct foists extraordinary hardships on enhanced injury defendants 
who are singled out among tortfeasors for discriminatory application 
of proximate cause and comparative fault principles.135 
In practice, because of the laws of physics and principles of en-
ergy management, it is often difficult to distinguish between so-called 
"accident-causing" and "injury-enhancing" conduct. The enhance-
ment of injuries runs hand in hand with the severity of the accident. 
For example, each incremental increase in speed results in a corre-
sponding increase in crash consequences because the forces unleashed 
in the crash are magnified exponentially.136 Thus, any conduct which 
influences the severity of an accident, thereby constituting a proximate 
dent is inadmissible because plaintiffs or driver's comparative fault is not relevant in an 
enhanced injury case unless it is a proximate cause of the enhanced injury). 
133. See Reichert, supra note 42, at 118. Mr. Reichert further explains that the com-
parison of accident-causing fault and injury-enhancing fault contradicts Larsen and the axi-
oms on which enhanced injury liability rests by erroneously basing the manufacturer's 
liability on the proximate causation of the initial accident rather than on the proximate 
causation of the enhanced injuries. He believes that accident-causing fault, while dearly a 
cause-in-fact of enhanced injuries, is not the proximate cause of such injuries. Id. at 125; 
see also MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, at 
62,736 (1979) (discussing proximate causation versus causation in fact in enhanced injury 
cases). 
134. See Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 890 F.2d 1540,1550 (10th Cir. 1989), cert 
denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993); Harvey v. General Motors Corp.r873 F2d 1343,1349 (10th 
Cir. 1989); Michael rioenig, The American Law Institute Restatement Draft, N.Y. LJ., May 
9,1994, at 3, 6-7; John M. Thomas, Comparative Fault in Crashworthiness or Second Colli-
sion Cases, 22 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 540, 541-42 (May 20,1994). 
135. See Thomas, supra note 134, at 54. 
136. Hoenig, supra note 134, at 6. 
HemOnhne 36 S Tex L Rev 439 1995 
440 SOUTH TEXAS LA W REVIEW [Vol. 36:417 
cause of enhanced injury, should be compared with a manufacturer's 
fault. 
Finally, public policy dictates that all of the plaintiffs conduct 
contributing to enhanced injuries be considered in allocating fault 
Driver misconduct, such as driving while intoxicated or under the in-
fluence of drugs, must be deterred through the application of compar-
ative fault rules, regardless of the type of tortfeasor the plaintiff 
chooses to pursue.137 
D. Recent Decisions and Trends 
Enhanced injury 'cases decided over the past two years clearly 
demonstrate that the controversial burden of proof issue continues to 
cause substantial difficulty for courts. The divisive Huddell-Caiazzo-
Fox-Mitchell split appears irreconcilable at this stage in the develop-
ment of enhanced injury theory. However, at least over thfe last two 
years, it is arguable that more jurisdictions have issued opinions sup-
porting the Huddell-Caiazzo approach than the Fox-Mitchell ap-
proach.138 It remains to be seen whether this trend will continue. 
L Pro Fox-Mitchell 
The Illinois Court of Appeals recently adopted the Fox-Mitchell 
substantial factor approach in Oakes v. General Motors Corp.139 The 
plaintiff in Oakes, who was not wearing a seat belt, was paralyzed 
when his 1982 Chevrolet Camaro was rear-ended at a traffic light by a 
pickup truck with a snow plow bracket mounted on its front end.140 
The plaintiff brought suit against the driver of the pickup and General 
Motors, alleging that a defect in the seat mechanism allowed the 
driver's seatback to collapse upon impact, causing his paralysis, an in-
divisible injury. On appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, 
the Illinois Appellate Court held that concepts of enhanced injury do 
not apply when a plaintiffs injury is indivisible and evidence supports 
a finding that each defendant proximately caused the plaintiff s injury. 
Under these circumstances, defendants will be held jointly and sever-
ally liable for the entirety of the harm.141 The court rejected the Hud-
137. Hoenig, supra note 134, at 6; Thomas, supra note 134, at 54. 
138. The Reporters for the new Restatement (Third) have taken the position that most 
cases supporting the Huddell position are dated. See Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, 
§11 cmt. d, at 275-76. An analysis of recent case law, however, demonstrates that this 
assertion is unfounded. See infra notes 152-63 and accompanying text. 
139. 628 N.E.2d 341 (111. App. Ct. 1993). 
140. Id. at 342. 
141. Id. at 347-48. 
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dell standard as being a "nearly insurmountable burden/* and instead 
voiced its support of the Mitchell substantial factor approach.142 
Shortly after the Oakes decision, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals applied Illinois law in DePaepe v. General Motors Corp.143 
In this case, the plaintiff also was paralyzed when his 1984 Buick Re-
gal was struck on the passenger side by another car. The plaintiff 
brought suit against the manufacturer, arguing that the sun visor-
header system was defectively designed and unreasonably danger-
ous.144 Relying on Oakes, the Seventh Circuit reversed a jury verdict 
in General Motors' favor, agreeing with DePaepe's argument that the 
trial court erred in instructing the jury on enhanced injury because he 
suffered a single, indivisible injury incapable of apportionment. The 
court of appeals held that the trial court should have first determined 
as a matter of law whether the plaintiffs injury was indivisible and 
then instructed the jury that if it found the alleged defect was a sub-
stantial factor in producing the injury, it should return a verdict for the 
plaintiff.145 
The Nebraska Supreme Court also recently adopted the Fox-
Mitchell substantial factor approach in Kudlacek v. Fiat S.p.A.146 The 
plaintiff, having sustained disabling head injuries in a rollover acci-
dent, alleged that the Rat Xl-9 he was riding in was defectively 
designed because it did not provide adequate passenger protection in 
rollover or side impact collisions. The Nebraska Supreme Court re-
versed Hat's directed verdict on the enhanced injury claims, holding 
that under Nebraska law, proof of a reasonable alternative design 
which would have resulted in less severe injuries is no longer required 
for a claimant to recover under a claim of defective design.147 In addi-
tion, the court found that "the substantial factor standard harmonizes 
with Nebraska law" of proximate causation, and that the plaintiff had 
presented adequate proof under the substantial factor test to submit 
his enhanced injury claim to the jury.148 _ 
Similarly, in Hansen v. Crown Controls Corp.,149 the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals applied the Fox-Mitchell substantial factor approach 
142. Id. at 348-49. 
143. 33 F3d 737 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Illinois law). 
144. Id. at 738. 
145. Mat 742. 
146. 509 N.W2d 603, 612 (Neb. 1994). 
147. Mat 611. 
148. Id. at 611-12. 
149. 512 N.W.2d 509, 514 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993), vacated in part on other grounds, 519 
N.W.2d 346 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). 
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consistent with prior Wisconsin decisions on enhanced injury.150 
However, the court emphasized that the jury's apportionment of cau-
sation for separately produced injuries under an enhanced injury the-
ory remains consistent with Wisconsin law.151 
2. Pro Huddell-Caiazzo 
Several recent state and federal court decisions applying Penn-
sylvania law reaffirm that state's commitment to the Huddell-Caiazzo 
burden of proof approach. In Kupetz v.* Deere & Co.,152 a Penn-
sylvania state court finally formally recognized the enhanced injury 
theory as a viable "subset of a products liability action" under Penn-
sylvania law.153 Kupetz involved a John Deere bulldozer which was 
alleged to be defective and unreasonably dangerous due to lack of a 
rollover protection system. On appeal from a judgment in favor of 
defendants, the court held that although enhanced injury is a viable 
theory of recovery which requires the claimant to prove each of the 
three Huddell elements, the operator's assumption of the risk in this 
case completely barred his recovery.154 
Likewise, the New Jersey Superior Court has recently explicitly 
affirmed that the Huddell doctrine applies to enhanced injury cases 
decided under New Jersey law.155 In McLaughlin v. Nissan Motor 
150. See Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 360 N.W.2d 2,11 (Wis. 1984); 
Maskrey v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 370 N.WJZd 815, 821 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985). 
151. Hansen, 512 N.W.2d at 514 (emphasis added). 
152. 644 A.2d 1213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). 
153. Id at 1215,1218. 
154. Id. at 1218-22. For additional recent case law demonstrating Pennsylvania's sup-
port of the Huddell approach, see Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 36 F3d 278,284 (3d Cir. 
1994) (recognising Kupetz decision and predicting Pennsylvania Supreme Court would fol-
low its views); Kolesar v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 815 F. Supp. 818, 821 (M.D. Pa. 
1992) (stating (hat the Huddell approach was adopted in Habecker), affd, 995 F.2d 217 (3d 
Cir. 1993); Dorsett v. American Isu2u Motors, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 1212, 1218 (E.D. Pa.) 
(stating the plaintiff must prove three Huddell elements to prevail), affd, 977 F.2d 567 (3d 
Cir. 1992); Harries v. General Motors Corp., 786 F. Supp. 446,449 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (hold-
ing that the manufacturer and the driver of car in which the plaintiff was injured are not 
joint tortfeasors and the manufacturer cannot sustain third party complaint against the 
driver where the plaintiff is only seeking damages for his enhanced injuries); Craigie v. 
General Motors Corp., 740 F. Supp. 353,361 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that Huddell governs 
the burden of proof until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court speaks on the issue); Mills v. 
Ford Motor Co., 142 F.R.D. 271, 273 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that the plaintiff had the 
burden of establishing the three Huddell elements). 
155. McLaughlin v. Nissan Motor Corp., 630 A.2d 857, 860 (N J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1993). New Jersey's commitment to Huddell was questioned by the Restatement (Third) 
Reporters in their analysis of case law on the burden of proof issue. See Council Draft No. 
2, supra note 5, § 11 cmt. d, at 267-78. 
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Corp.?56 the court held that the plaintiffs action alleging inadequate 
padding of the A-pillar should have been dismissed because the plain-
tiff failed to sustain her burden of proof of enhancement under Hud-
dell151 Significantly, the plaintiffs medical expert admitted on cross-
examination that he was unable to quantify the injury the plaintiff 
would have received if the A-pillar had been adequately padded, ex-
cept to say that it would have been less serious.158 
In an unpublished decision applying Kentucky law, the Sixth Cir-
cuit recently adopted the Huddell-Caiazzo approach. In O'Bryan v. 
Volkswagen of America?59 the plaintiff alleged that defects in the door 
latch and passive restraint system of his. 1987 Volkswagen Jetta caused 
or contributed to his paraplegic injuries when he was ejected through 
the driver's door during a rollover accident occurring at a speed in 
excess of fifty-five miles per hour.160 The court of appeals reversed a 
nearly six million dollar jury verdict in the plaintiffs favor and entered 
judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the plaintiff had 
failed to prove causation. Although the plaintiff suggested a "better" 
passive restraint design, he did not establish that the alternative sys-
tem would have prevented his injuries in this accident; nor did he pro-
pose a reasonable alternative design for a more crashworthy door 
lock. The court expressly rejected the plaintiff's argument that his in-
juries were indivisible, noting Kentucky's statutory adoption of com-
parative fault which uses the same allocative process.161 
In Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co.,162 the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the defendant manufacturer 
and held that the trial court did not err in giving a second collision 
instruction requiring the plaintiff to prove that the alleged defect was 
the sole cause of his enhanced injuries.163 
156. 630 A.2d 857 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law, Div. 1993). 
* 157. Id. at 861. 
158. Id, at 859. 
159. 39 F.3d 1182,1994 WL 599450 (6th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). 
160. Id. at *1. 
161. Id. at *4 n.6. 
162. 986 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying Missouri law). 
163. Id. at 269 (reasoning that the plaintiffs failed to object to this instruction and also 
offered a nearly identical instruction themselves). For other recent cases supporting the 
Huddell approach, see Reed v. Chrysler Corp., 494 N.W.2d 224,228 (Iowa 1992) (holding 
that the trial court erred by directing verdict for defendant when the plaintiff presented 
sufficient evidence to reach jury on each of three Huddell elements); Hillrichs v. Avco 
Corp., 478 N.W.2d 70,75 (Iowa 1991) (holding that the plaintiff offered sufficient evidence 
under the Huddell test to reach the jury even though the extent of enhanced injury was not 
fixed with certainty and the jury was not precluded from quantifying the enhanced loss 
within a reasonable margin of error); Armstrong v. Lorino, 580 So. 2d 528, 530 (La. Ct. 
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III. PROPOSED RESTATEMENT SECTION ON ENHANCED INJURY 
The purpose of a Restatement is to promote greater certainty and 
uniformity in the law by creating coherent rules and policies through 
the codification of existing common law, while at the same time elimi-
nating unnecessary complexities. It should be analytical, critical, and 
constructive.164 
Consistent with these goals, the Reporters for the Restatement 
(Third)16S envisioned their task as one of "restating" section 402A of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts by changing the relevant language 
to conform to current understandings, thereby clarifying much of the 
confusion that has arisen over the years.166 The Reporters further em-
phasized that: 
We have . . . chosen a moderate approach in drafting our sug-
gested revision. We intend to stay as close as possible to shared 
perceptions of the evolved meanings of the original section and 
its comments. We do not fancy ourselves as radical reformers, 
although we express preferences, based on widely recognized 
normative criteria, when choices are appropriate. Finally, we 
propose to identify those areas in which true controversy reigns 
and in which neither predictions nor recommendations are in 
order.167 
The Reporters clearly recognized that a restatement should accu-
rately reflect the law as it has developed and attempt to clarify areas 
of confusion and inconsistency. A restatement of the law should also 
attempt to be impartial, logical, and internally consistent. 
However, in contradiction to their announced intentions, the Re-
porters have proposed the following black letter section on enhanced 
injury: 
Increased Harm Due to Product Defect 
(a) When a product is defective within the meaning of § 2 
and the defect is a substantial factor in increasing the 
App. 1991) (holding that the plaintiff is required to prove existence of defect and extent of 
enhancement; directed verdict in favor of defendant affirmed where expert evidence estab-
lished that injuries would have occurred regardless of defective seat latch); Garcia v. Ri-
vera, 553 N.Y.S2d 378, 380 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (holding that defendant's motion for 
summary judgment should have been granted where plaintiff failed to demonstrate his 
ability to meet the Huddell three-prong test). 
164. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1934), Introduction at vii-ix; James F. Byrne, Jr., 
Reevaluation of the Restatement as a Source of Law in Arizona, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 1021, 
1022-23 (1973). 
165. Tlie Reporters for this revision are Aaron D. Twerski of Brooklyn Law School 
and James A. Henderson, Jr. of Cornell Law School. 
166. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512,1513 (1992). 
167. Id. 
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harm suffered by the plaintiff beyond the harm that 
would have resulted from nondefect-related causes, the 
product seller is subject to liability for the increased 
harm, 
(b) If proof supports the apportionment of liability among 
responsible actors, the extent of the seller's liability is 
determined according to such proof and is limited to 
the increased harm, 
(c) If proof does not support apportionment of liability, 
then the product seller is liable for all of the harm suf-
fered by the plaintiff from both the defect and the other 
causes, 
(d) A seller of a defective product who is held liable for 
part of the harm suffered by the plaintiff under the rule 
stated in Subsection (b), or all the harm suffered by the 
plaintiff under the rule stated in Subsection (c), is 
jointly and severally liable with all other parties who 
bear legal responsibility for causing the harm, deter-
mined by applicable rules of joint and several 
liability.1^ 
A. Reasonable Alternative Design 
By referring to the definition of defect contained in section 2,169 
the proposed Restatement (Third) section on enhanced injury properly 
requires the plaintiff to prove the existence of a design defect through 
proof of a reasonable alternative design which would have reduced or 
168. Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 11, at 253. 
169. Section 2 of Council Draft No. 2 of the Restatement (Third) provides: 
For purposes of determining liability under § 1: 
(a) a product contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs 
from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in 
the preparation and marketing of the product; 
(b) a product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed 
by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a 
reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a pred-
ecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the 
alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe; 
(c) a product is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings 
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have 
been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or 
warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the com-
mercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the instructions or 
warnings renders the product not reasonably safe. 
Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 2, at 13-14. 
In relying on § 2, yet shifting the burden of proof of enhancement to the defendant 
based on inapplicable rules pertaining to concurrent tortfeasors, the Reporters have cre-
ated a contradiction between sections which many courts will struggle with in the future. 
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eliminated the enhanced injuries sustained.170 In addition, the Re-
porters make clear in their comments that the reasonableness of a 
given design is properly determined through a balancing of elements 
of risk against elements of utility.171 The overall safety of the entire 
product must be considered, and it is not sufficient that the alternative 
design would have reduced or prevented the harm suffered by the 
plaintiff if it would result in an increase of other dangers of equal or 
greater magnitude.172 The draft Restatement {Third) has expressly 
recognized, as have many courts and commentators,173 that a negli-
gence-based reasonableness standard is the only fair method by which 
to judge alleged design defects.174 
B. Scope of Duty 
The body of proposed section 11 does not contain a statement of 
the duty giving rise to enhanced injury liability. The Reporters' con-
ception of that duty, however, does appear in comment a which states: 
"A manufacturer has a duty to design and manufacture its product so 
as reasonably to reduce the foreseeable harm that may occur in an acci-
dent brought about by causes other than defect/'175 
When the Reporters' conception of this duty is compared to the 
duty described in Larsen*76 it is glaringly apparent that the Restate-
ment (Third) duty is much broader in scope. Indeed, this is just the 
sort of expansion of duty that the Dreisonstok court was concerned 
about when it warned twenty years ago that "[fjoreseeability... is not 
to be equated with duty."177 
Forcing the enhanced injury duty to cover all "foreseeable" acci-
dent situations is an unwarranted expansion of the enhanced injury 
doctrine, has no basis in the law and leads to absolute liability. Thus, 
although black letter subsection (a) of the enhanced injury section is 
170. See also Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, $ 11 cmt; b, at 256 (emphasizing that 
the reasonable alternative design must reduce harm). 
171. Id. § 2 cmt. c, at 22, § 11 cmt b, at 256-57. A risk-utility balancing test fairly takes 
into account such factors as the magnitude of foreseeable risks of harm, instructions and 
warnings accompanying the product, the nature and strength of consumer expectations, the 
effects of the alternative design on costs of production and product function, the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of proposed safety features, product longevity, maintenance 
and repair, esthetics, and marketability. Id. § 2 cmt. d, at 28-29. 
172. Id. § 2 cmt. d, at 29, § 11 cmt. b, at 256-57. 
173. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
174. Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5: § 2 cmt. a, at 15-19, cmt. d, at 28-34. 
175. Id. § 11 cmt. a, at 254 (emphasis added). 
176. Larsen imposed a duty to use reasonable care in design to protect against unrea-
sonable risks of injury or enhancement of injury. 391 F.2d at 504 (emphasis added). 
177. Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1070 (4th Cir. 1974). 
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an accurate statement of enhanced injury theory as applied by many 
jurisdictions, the scope of the duty described in the comment goes way 
beyond the duty contemplated in Larsen and must be scaled back. 
C Shift in Burden of Proof 
The most troubling aspect of the proposed Restatement (Third) 
section on enhanced injury is that it has the practical effect of shifting 
the burden of proof of the extent of enhanced injury to the defendant 
once the plaintiff has shown that the alleged defect was a "substantial 
factor" in increasing the plaintiffs harm, thus adopting the Fox-Mitch-
ell approach- Although black letter subsections (b) and (c) do not 
formally shift this burden, the Reporters explicitly advocate such a 
shift in their comments and note.178 
In their note, the Reporters engage in a detailed discussion of 
case law and conclude that a "strong majority" of courts that have 
considered the issue have adopted a rule supporting the draft Restate-
ment (Third) position. As much of the above discussion illustrates, 
however, the burden of proof issue remains extremely divisive, with 
recent decisions being almost evenly split. No "majority" position has 
yet emerged. In fact, most states have not yet directly addressed the 
issue. 
Furthermore, in their case analysis, the Reporters mischaracterize 
many states as supportive of the Fox-Mitchell approach when their 
case law either clearly does not support that approach or has not yet 
addressed the issue. For example, although the New Jersey Superior 
Court has expressly held that the Huddell standard governs enhanced 
injury cases decided under New Jersey law,179 the Reporters question 
New Jersey's commitment to Huddell and incredibly count New Jersey 
as a state supporting the Fox-Mitchell approach.180 In another exam-
ple of such mischaracterization, the Reporters include Indiana as sup-
portive of the Fox-Mitchell approach even though a clear split of 
authority exists in that state at the appellate court level.181 Colorado 
is also characterized as strongly leaning toward the Fox-Mitchell camp 
based on a 1980 successive collision case, Romero v. Parker,182 which 
178. See Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 11, Reporters* Note to cmt. d, at 267-78. 
179. See McLaughlin v. Nissan Motor Corp., 630 A.2d 857,860 (N J. Super. Ct. 1993). 
180. See Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 11 Reporters* Note to cmt. d, at 267-78. 
181. Compare Jackson v. Warrum, 535 N.E2d 1207,1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (adopt-
ing Fox-Mitchell approach) with Masterman v. Veldman's Equip., Inc., 530 N.E.2d 312, 318 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (adopting Huddell approach). 
182. 619 P.2d 89, 90 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980). 
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held tortfeasors jointly and severally liable for the entire harm.183 The 
Reporters fail to mention, however, that Colorado has since statuto-
rily abolished joint and several liability and adopted comparative 
fault,184 while also failing to acknowledge federal appellate court pre-
cedent imposing the burden of proving the extent of enhancement 
upon the plaintiff under Colorado law.185 
While acknowledging that "the product seller is responsible only 
for the increased harm, and not for the harm that would have oc-
curred even had the product been fully adequate/*186 and that "basic 
principles of causation limit the damages to those resulting from the 
increase in plaintiffs harm caused by the defect,"187 the Reporters 
nonetheless fail to enforce these concepts through the proposed Re-
statement (Third). As discussed above, logically, a plaintiff must prove 
the degree of enhancement in order to prove the existence of a defect 
(/.e., the availability of a reasonable alternative design), and .causation. 
It is simply not possible to show that a safer, reasonable alternative 
design existed without showing what injuries could have been avoided 
with that design. 
The proposed Restatement (Third) section on enhanced injury 
also relies on section 433B(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts*88 
in justifying its shift in the burden of proof of enhancement and impo-
sition of joint and several liability- As discussed above,189 however, 
this reliance is misplaced. Comment d of the draft Restatement 
(Third) states, "[djefendant, a proved wrongdoer who has in fact 
183. Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 11, Reporters* Note to cmt. d, at 268, 274. 
184. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-21-406,13-21-1113 (1989 & Supp. 1994). 
185. See Curtis v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 808,813 (10th Cir. 1981); TMoya v. 
Sears Roebuck & Co., 884 F.2d 1330,1339 (10th Cir. 1989). But see Mile Hi Concrete, Inc. 
v. Matz, 842 P.2d 198, 201 n.17 (Colo. 1992) (disagreeing with the holding in Curtis). The 
Reporters repeatedly cite questionable and irrelevant state precedent to predict that juris-
dictions will adopt the Fox-Mitchell approach. For example, the Reporters cite Haft v. 
Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d 465 (Ca). 1970), as indicating that California will eventually 
shift the burden of proof of enhancement to the defendant,, in spite of the fact that the 
California Court of Appeals expressly held that the Haft decision did not apply to en-
hanced injury cases and refused to shift the burden of proof of enhancement to the defen-
dant in Endicott v. Nissan Motor Corp., 141 Cal. Rptr. 95,101 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). The 
Reporters rely similarly on an Arkansas successive collision case, Woodward v. Blyth, 462 
S.W.2d 205,209 (Ark. 1971), and an Alaska case dealing with the burden of proving that 
design benefits outweigh risks, Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 886 (Alaska 
1979), to predict that these two states will follow Fox-MitchzH. Council Draft No. 2, supra 
note 5, § 11, Reporters* Note to cmt. d, at 274. 
186. Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 11 cmt a, at 254. 
187. Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 11 cmt a, at 254. 
188. See supra note 66 (providing the text of this section). 
189. See supra note 125 and accompanying text 
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caused harm to the plaintiff, should not escape liability because the 
nature of the harm makes apportionment impossible."190 This oft-
cited argument refuses to recognize that the enhanced injury defen-
dant cannot be a "proved wrongdoer" until the plaintiff has properly 
proven the existence of a defect and causation, both of which require 
a comparison of the injuries actually sustained with the injuries which 
would have been sustained had the reasonable alternative design been 
used. 
Also misplaced is the Reporters* reliance on arguments of plain-
tiff hardships in retaining experts and proving hypothetical injuries, as 
well as juror difficulty in evaluating such issues. In practice, plaintiffs, 
as well as defendants, have no difficulty whatsoever in obtaining non-
speculative expert testimony to establish the hypothetical injuries 
which would have occurred in an accident absent the alleged defect. 
As discussed above, defendants are regularly required to prove such 
hypotheticals in asserting the seat belt defense in those jurisdictions 
where it is allowed. Likewise, juries have no difficulty comparing such 
hypothetical injuries with those that actually occurred and making 
similar determinations of damages. For example, triers of fact are al-
lowed to make comparably inexact calculations in returning awards in 
personal injury cases involving pain and suffering, in projecting lost 
future earnings or lost profits, and in making comparative negligence 
determinations.191 These arguments do not justify relieving plaintiffs 
from the burden of proving that which they allege in an enhanced 
injury case—that lesser injuries would have been sustained had a dif-
ferent design been used. 
D. Joint and Several Liability 
Another troubling aspect of the proposed Restatement (Third) 
provision on enhanced injury is its imposition of joint and several lia-
bility, under subsection (d), on product sellers found liable under sub-
sections (b) or (c) for part or all of the harm suffered by a plaintiff. 
The Reporters state in comment e that "[jjoint and several liability is 
imposed because there is no practical method of apportioning liability 
that would reflect the separate causal contributions of those who 
caused the increased harm."192 
The Restatement (Third) position does not take into account that 
the trend in modern tort law is away from joint and several liability 
190. Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 11 cmt. dt at 261 (emphasis added). 
191. See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text. 
192. Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 11 cmt. e, at 262. 
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and toward more equitable rules of comparative fault. Indeed, as the 
Reporters also recognize, many states have statutorily abolished joint 
and several liability in favor of some sort of comparative fault 
system-193 
If the Larsen principles are to be honored, an enhanced injury 
defendant cannot be held liable, jointly and severaUy or otherwise, for 
any harm beyond that which is proven to have been increased or ag-
gravated by a product defect. As recognized by the Larsen court in 
1968,194 the dilemma of the apportionment of indivisible injuries is 
nonexistent when viewed from a practical perspective. Experts regu-
larly provide such opinions and juries regularly perform similar appor-
tionments in other contexts. Moreover, it is inequitable to allow 
plaintiffs to rely on the divisibility inherent in the concept of "en-
hanced injuries" in order to assert a claim against a product seller, and 
then argue that such injuries are indivisible in order to hold the prod-
uct seller jointly and severally liable for all damages.195 
E. Comparative Fault 
In Council Draft Number T\vo, the Reporters for the proposed 
Restatement (Third) correctly recognize the majority view that all 
types of plaintiff conduct proximately causing enhanced injury should 
be compared with an enhanced injury defendant's injury-causing fault 
in allocating responsibility for damages.196 
193. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-21-406,13-21-111.5 (1989 & Supp. 1994). 
194. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 503-04. 
195. See Levenstam & Lapp, supra note 19, at 84. 
196. Council Draft No. 2, supra note 5, § 11 crat f, a» 264 and Reporters' Note to cmt. 
f, at 279-80. This conclusion was reached in the first Council Draft of the proposed Re-
statement (Third). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 105 cmt. 
f, at 181-82 and Reporters* Note to cmt. f, at 210-14 (Council Draft No. 11993). However, 
the Reporters then advocated the opposite view in Council Draft No. 1A and Tentative 
Draft No. 1, arguing that a plaintiffs negligence in causing the initial accident should not 
be considered in apportioning liability between the plaintiff and the product sellers unless 
proof did not support apportionment of the injuries and the product sellers were held 
jointly and severally liable for all injuries. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD-
UCTS LIABILITY § 6 cmt f, at 97-99 and Reporters* Note to cmt f, at 214-18 (Council Draft 
No. 1A, 1994); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. f, at 
120-22 and Reporters' Note to cmt. f, at 140-43 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994). Further 
debate followed this switch in position, prompting additional analysis of the issue, and 
ultimately resulting in readoption of the majority view allowing comparison of all forms of 
plaintiff fault. 
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IV. CONCLUSION: TOWARD AN EQUITABLE APPROACH 
While the enhanced injury doctrine is appropriately here to stay, 
it should not result in enhanced liability for product manufacturers 
which are more attentive to safety today than at any other time in 
history.197 The current debate over the scope of the enhanced injury 
duty or the burden of proof of enhancement ultimately comes down to 
a question of fairness—fairness to those directly involved in enhanced 
injury litigation as well as fairness to the consuming public. In those 
difficult and sympathetic cases where seriously injured plaintiffs may 
be unable to show the existence of a duty or to sustain their burden of 
proof of enhancement, yet will need extensive care for the remainder 
of their lives, is it fair that product manufacturers and sellers bear 
these costs? Or are we allowing these difficult cases to misdirect the 
law? The burden of proof of enhancement must be clarified and uni-
formly applied in a manner consistent with the doctrine's theoretical 
underpinnings in order to make the entire theory workable. Such ef-
forts will certainly result in greater uniformity and predictability in 
this area of the law, with far-reaching benefits. 
As some have pointed out, the law of products liability aims to 
distribute the "loss" attributable to a product defect, not the total cost 
of accidents.198 American manufacturers are already hobbled by the 
enormous costs of liability insurance and products litigation. Beyond 
question, these costs have had a detrimental effect on the ability of 
many American industries to successfully compete in world markets, 
and have even threatened the continued existence of some industries. 
It is also likely that these costs have had a chilling effect on the incen-
tives of manufacturers to create new products and new safety de-
vices.199 The legal system, through the Restatement (Third), the 
judiciary, and perhaps elected government officials, has an obligation 
to address these considerations by developing a workable system of 
products liability law which will compensate deserving plaintiffs, while 
at the same time treating defendant product sellers and the public 
fairly. 
197. This increased focus on safety is itself in part the result of the development of 
enhanced injury theory over the last three decades. It is also the result of many other 
interrelated factors, such as the changing attitudes of the American public (also increas-
ingly concerned with safety), and the growth and refinement of governmental safety orga-
nizations (such as the NHTSA, the FDA, and the FAA), wmVn now conduct sophisticated 
testing and mandate minimum safety standards for numerous products and services. 
198. O'Donnell, supra note 42, at 350. 
199. Many enhanced injury cases are filed based on the development of new safety 
devices, such as roll bars, air bags, etc., which wouid have reduced the plaintiffs injuries 
had the device been developed and installed by the manufacturer earlier. 
HeinOnline -- 36 S Tex L Rev 451 1995 
